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ABSTRACT 
 
The present study explores the relationship between trust placed in national institutions 
and opinion of globalization. A secondary data analysis is conducted using data collected 
by the European Commission in a 2004 Eurobarometer survey of European Union (EU) 
citizens on various issues regarding the EU, globalization and national challenges. A 
prominent theme in the literature is that, in recent times, globalization has had the effect 
of compromising the sovereignty of nation-states. This has generated a backlash of 
nationalistic attitudes wherein globalization is posited in opposition to the nation-state. 
This surge in nationalism has reinforced a culture wherein any external force that has the 
capacity to compromise or merely challenge national sovereignty is deemed undesirable. 
The EU represents a unique response to the phenomenon of globalization. It is the only 
economic bloc that attempts to manage globalization and mitigate its negative effects 
through the promotion of a free market system that is actively reinforced by political and 
social transnational unity. By assessing EU citizens’ opinion of globalization and its 
relation to national attachment, one can investigate whether in living in a system of 
shared national sovereignty, which attempts to actively manage globalization, one 
experiences globalization not as an external invasive force, but as an integral component 
of the nation-state. 
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 1 
CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
 A prominent theme in the literature is that, in recent times, globalization has had 
the effect of compromising the sovereignty of nation-states (Habermas 1998a; Habermas 
1998b; Falk 1999; Giddens 2000; Sassen 2006). This has generated a backlash of 
nationalistic attitudes in which globalization is posited in opposition to the nation-state 
(O’Rourke and Sinnott 2001; Rankin 2001; Mayda and Rodrik 2005). This surge in 
nationalism has reinforced a culture wherein any external force that has the capacity to 
compromise or merely challenge national sovereignty is deemed undesirable. The 
implications of these phenomena are of global significance. Reactionary nationalism not 
only reduces nation-states’ capacity to cooperate on the international level and to 
collectively address the global challenges of the 21
st
 century, but can also contribute to 
international conflict. 
 Historically, nationalism as a world view has been considerably salient and 
pervasive. This is evident in the fact that nationalism has greatly contributed to both 
national and international conflict. Most wars in the past two hundred years have been 
fought in the name of the nation. However, since the advent of post-modernity, 
globalization has challenged, redefined and reconfigured nationalism and the nation-state 
(Habermas 1998b; Falk 1999). As Castell points out, “Economies throughout the world 
have become globally interdependent, introducing a new form of relationship between 
economy, state, and society, in a system of variable geometry” (Castell 1996:1).  
 Although nationalism has retained its salience, it has taken on a more implicit 
nature while, nonetheless, continuing to contribute to global political and social turmoil. 
This is manifested in various ways. It is, for one, reflected in nation-states’ incapacity to 
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cooperate on global issues such as climate change. The recent Copenhagen accords on 
climate change serve as proof. The negotiations resulted in a series of weak and 
marginally impacting agreements, handicapped by an overarching consensus that the 
sovereignty of nation-states would in no way be infringed upon (United Nations 2009). 
Nationalism’s contribution to social conflict is also reflected in national citizens’ 
opposition to and prejudice against immigrants. Evidence of this is Switzerland’s recent 
ban of minarets and the campaign in support of the legislation – a highly racist campaign 
tainted with intolerance and politically incorrect imagery and mottos (Euronews 2009). 
Perhaps nationalism’s most belligerent manifestation is in situations where the potential 
for military confrontation and regional instability is exacerbated, as in the case of the 
United States’ recent confrontation with Iran. In light of these realities it is essential to 
thoroughly study and address the relationship between national attachment and 
globalization. 
 Several scholars have raised awareness to the issue of the need for supranational 
institutions and processes (Habermas 1998b; Falk 1999; Giddens 2000; Sassen 2006). 
Their basic premise is that the challenges put forth by globalization cannot be managed 
by the traditional institution of the nation-state. Global issues and challenges require 
global and supranational coordination. As Habermas asserts,  
 
“We can no longer view the world economy as an ‘international’ system of exchange in 
which nation-states participate as important actors, buttressed by their respective 
economics and competing with one another through foreign trade channels. Instead, the 
economy’s globalization creates a transnational system that blurs the boundaries between 
domestic and foreign trade” (Habermas 1998a:3) 
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 The recent economic collapse of 2008 serves as evidence to this assertion wherein 
economic deregulation and Wall Street’s speculative business and finance practices had 
the effect of driving the global economy into a recession. The question raised by 
economists, pundits and the public around the world was that of how to prevent such 
crises from reoccurring. Economic regulation was the common sense answer. However, 
what is difficult to address is how to implement economic standards that are congruent 
between nation-states in order to prevent malevolent economic practices in one country 
from adversely affecting the economies of others. Such efforts require the 
implementation of supranational structures, institutions and procedures. 
 There have been marginal efforts in this respect. For example, following the 
financial crisis of 2008, the European Parliament and the Obama administration led a 
cooperative effort to end tax havens (CBS News 2009; European Parliament 2009). 
Chrysler’s recent merger with Italian automaker Fiat, a process mediated by the U.S. 
government, also reflects this shift toward supranational cooperation (Jackson 2009). 
Keenly aware of the need for business practices that are congruent with the global 
challenges of the 21
st
 century, as wells as the global need for fuel efficient technology, 
the Obama administration reached out to Fiat, a company highly successful in both 
respects. Moreover, there has been an increasing trend toward inter-governmental 
cooperation in recent years, albeit mostly in respect to economics. Examples include 
international agreements such as The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
and businesses and regional organizations such as the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
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(SAARC). However, the only example of supranational decision-making processes being 
comprehensively implemented and institutionalized is that of the European Union (EU), 
wherein cooperation and integration occurs on the social, political and economic level. 
 The EU represents a unique response to the phenomenon of globalization. It is the 
only economic bloc that attempts to manage globalization and mitigate its negative 
effects through the promotion of a free market system that is actively reinforced by 
political and social transnational unity. The unique structure of the EU, the only 
supranational organization in the world, poses a challenge as well as an opportunity for 
research examining the relationship between national attachment and opinion of 
globalization. The fact that its current member states, after fighting two world wars 
against one another, are able to cooperate on the political, social and economic level in a 
system of shared sovereignty, renders it a case of academic interest. By assessing EU 
citizens’ opinion of globalization and its relation to national attachment, one can 
investigate whether in living in a system of shared national sovereignty, which attempts 
to actively manage globalization, one experiences globalization not as an external 
invasive force, but as an integral component of the nation-state. The present study 
explores the relationship between trust placed in national institutions and opinion of 
globalization. A secondary data analysis is conducted using data collected by the 
European Commission in a 2004 Eurobarometer survey of EU citizens on various issues 
regarding the EU, globalization and national challenges. 
Throughout the study, various dimensions, aspects, implications and definitions of 
globalization are explored. For methodological purposes, the Eurobarometer’s definition 
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of globalization is used in the Analysis and Findings section. The Eurobarometer defines 
globalization as the opening up of all economies which leads to the creation of a truly 
world market (Eurobarometer 2004). The findings will be interpreted through the lens of 
this definition, which captures the neo-liberal economic dimension of globalization 
because this is the definition used during the Eurobarometer survey interviews which 
generated the data that is analyzed. The participants were provided with this definition 
before answering questions related to globalization. It is therefore essential, from a 
methodological standpoint, to interpret the data using the same definition of globalization 
that generated them in the first place. However, the phenomenon of globalization, as 
elucidated in the present study, is one of extreme complexity and multidimensionality. 
For this reason it is prudent to revert to a more comprehensive and nuanced conception of 
globalization in the Discussion section. This will enable a more complex and holistic 
understanding of the findings. 
 The study is organized as follows: Chapter 2 includes a review of literature and 
definitions of concepts. The main areas of focus are globalization, national institutions, 
the European Union and the determinant factors of opinion of globalization. Chapter 3 
delineates the theoretical framework, from which the appropriate methodological 
research approach is generated. Moreover, it provides a framework for interpreting the 
findings. Chapter 4 provides details about the data as well as the methodological research 
design. Chapter 5 includes data analyses as well as the findings, interpreted mainly 
through previous literature. Chapter 6 provides a more complex and comprehensive 
discussion of the findings, interpreted through the theoretical framework presented in 
 
6 
 
Chapter 3. Lastly, Chapter 7 concludes with suggestions for further research and 
considerations of the study’s broader implications. 
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CHAPTER 2: Review of Literature and Definitions of Concepts 
 
Overview 
The nature of globalization is a contested subject matter. Its definition varies 
qualitatively across actors, ideologies and disciplines. As Edwards points out, 
“Definitions of the phenomenon are as numerous as speculations about it” (Edwards 
2006:587). Granted, globalization primarily emerged as an economic force and is 
generally perceived and experienced as such. But in our era of post-modern 
interconnectivity, where information, images, exchanges and interactions can occur inter-
continentally within fractions of seconds, globalization has evolved into a force beyond 
economics. In order to provide a coherent context for the present research, the current 
chapter presents a comprehensive view of globalization, exploring its intricacies and 
multidimensionality.  
The analysis is based on two overarching premises. The first is that the 
phenomenon of globalization is of a pervasive nature, casting its shadow on virtually 
every social, economic and political community on the globe (Falk 1999; Giddens 2000). 
The second is that globalization is extremely complex and multidimensional (Falk 1999; 
Giddens 2000). As Giddens suggests, globalization “is political, technological, cultural, 
as well as economic” (Giddens 2000:28). The complex nature of globalization is 
manifested in the fact that even though its forces are felt and experienced by virtually 
every individual around the globe, there is no consensus on its definition. It is therefore 
compelling to dissect the phenomenon and analyze its various dimensions in order to 
present it in a holistic manner. 
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The present chapter begins with an historical analysis of globalization, focusing 
on its economic dimension and delineating its genesis. The emergence of globalization 
through the global colonial system and the driving forces behind colonialism are 
explored. Following this discussion, the exacerbation of and factors contributing to 
economic globalization in the 20
th
 century are examined. The impact of the Marshall 
Plan, the Bretton Woods System and the neo-liberal economic practices that have been 
particularly prevalent from the 1980s onward are assessed. 
Furthermore, the impact of technology on the facilitation of globalization is 
explored. Specifically, the impact of technological advancements during the 19
th
 
century’s Industrial Revolution in Europe and the 20
th
 century’s electronic revolution in 
the United States are considered. Next, an overview of the cultural implications of 
globalization and its political consequences is provided. Lastly, the determinant factors of 
opinion of globalization are assessed, providing an overview of what shapes peoples’ 
attitudes toward the phenomenon. 
 
Economic Globalization 
In contemporary economics, neo-liberal globalization can be understood as the 
opening up of all economies which leads to the creation of a truly world market 
(Eurobarometer 2003). This involves the elimination of protectionist trade barriers – the 
official implementation of policies that restrict international trade, such as tariffs and 
quotas on foreign goods. Theoretically, this facilitates the free and efficient movement of 
goods and services between nation-states at unfettered prices. For example, following the 
U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement and the North American Free Trade Agreement 
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(NAFTA), most tariffs affecting or limiting agricultural trade between the U.S., Canada 
and Mexico were removed (United States Department of Agriculture 2010).  
While the above definition presents the subject matter as a rational, voluntary and 
systemic process, the fact of the matter is that the history of global economic exchange is 
rooted in centuries of conquest, power struggles and social dismay; namely, the global 
colonial system, which can be thought of as the genesis of globalization.  
Colonization can be understood as “the subjugation by physical and psychological 
force of one culture by another – a colonizing power – through military conquest of 
territory and caricaturing the relation between the two cultures” (McMichael 2004:4). In 
practice, this entails the imposition of a system of social, political and economic control 
that challenges and distorts the existing societal structures of the subjugated parties. 
The colonial period typically refers to the period of European colonial expansion 
between the 15
th
 and the 20
th
 century. This process was pioneered by the Kingdoms of 
Portugal and Spain through their exploration and subsequent colonization of the Coast of 
Africa, the Middle East, East Asia and the Americas, dating back to the 15
th
 century. In 
the 17
th
 century, England, France and the Netherlands followed suit. However, it was the 
19
th
 and early 20
th
 century that saw the greatest rate of colonial expansion, particularly by 
The British Empire, France and later by Japan and the United States (Goff et al. 1998). 
During this time, The British Empire emerged as the largest empire in history, 
establishing colonies and settlements all around the globe. It hence came to be known as 
“the empire on which the sun never set”. In order to fully grasp these historically 
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significant phenomena and to assess the history of economic globalization 
comprehensively, one has to consider the driving forces behind European colonialism. 
In considering the ideological propellants, nationalism was one of the biggest 
culprits (Goff et al. 1998). As will be discussed later, nationalism is an ideological 
outlook where the nation-state is put on the highest pedestal and rendered supreme and 
absolute. Nationalism emerged as particularly salient during the 19
th
 century in 
industrialized European nations (Goff et al. 1998). Against the backdrop of nationalism, 
nation-states sought to expand their empires as a means to increase their power, supply 
themselves with foreign goods and raw material and to display their superiority (Goff et 
al. 1998). 
Colonial expansion can also be attributed to Europe’s high held values of 
technological development and civilizational advancement (Goff et al. 1998). When the 
Europeans came into contact with indigenous cultures outside Europe, they often 
perceived them as primitive, uncivilized and uncultured. Using this skewed perception as 
moral grounds, Europeans conquered and subjugated indigenous people with the 
justification that they were helping them advance technologically and become civilized 
(Goff et al. 1998). As McMichael points out, “Development came to be known as the 
destiny of humankind” for the Europeans (McMichael 2004:8).  
Religion also played a role in colonial expansion as Europeans sought to convert 
indigenous people to Christianity (Goff et al. 1998). Moreover, Europeans trying to avoid 
religious persecution at home settled colonies abroad, as is the case of the Puritan 
Christians setting up settlements and, subsequently, colonies in the Americas. 
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Economic expansion and capitalism also played a very prominent role in colonial 
expansion (Goff et al. 1998; McMichael 2004). As will be discussed later, 19
th
 century 
Europe saw an unprecedented rate of technological expansion. This expansion was partly 
derivative of capitalist growth. In essence, capitalism necessitated and facilitated 
technological growth in the form of efficient industrial manufacturing, transportation and 
mass communications, the consequence of which was the expansion of capitalist 
economic exchange within Europe. As industries and manufacturing grew, so did 
European markets. However, industrial production increased at a disproportionately 
higher rate than local economies. This, in turn, necessitated the expansion of markets 
both within and beyond national borders. This was to be achieved through colonization.  
The colonies functioned in two ways. First, they provided the raw materials that 
fueled European manufacturing. This resulted in a global system of labor division 
wherein colonies specialized in the extraction of raw materials and the production of 
primary goods that were then exported to European, industrialized countries and turned 
into finished products (McMichael 2004). These finished products were then exported 
back to the colonies for consumption. The colonies therefore also functioned as consumer 
markets (McMichael 2004). For example, under British rule, India exported cotton to 
England as raw material. The cotton was turned into cheap cloth in British factories and 
then exported back to India as a finished commodity (McMichael 2004). The culmination 
of the above events helped establish a global system of economic exchange which, with 
the help of 19
th
 century technological advancements, emerged as a pervasive global 
reality. But it took further economic developments in the 20
th
 century to elevate the 
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phenomenon of globalization to a global existential milieu through the further expansion 
of the global economic system (Goff et al. 1998). In addition to the manufacturer-
consumer cross-border relationships that were established in the 19
th
 century, the early 
20
th
 century saw an increase in cross-border bank relations and financial investments 
(Goff et al. 1998). Economies around the world were interconnected like never before. 
The global economic collapse of the 1930s serves as proof. Instigated by the New York 
Stock Exchange, the collapse had the consequent effect of generating a world-wide 
economic depression (Goff et al. 1998). The latter half of the 20
th
 century saw an even 
greater intensification of global economic exchange and interconnectivity, mainly 
attributed to several key global initiatives led by the United States. 
The first is the Marshall Plan, a bilateral development project mainly between the 
United States and Europe, which sought to reconstruct and stabilize national markets 
after the devastating events of the 1930s depression and the Second World War. This was 
to be achieved through a three way system of economic exchange. The United States 
would provide financial aid to other nations for development. Those nations would then 
finance the import of American technology and consumer goods. The Marshall Plan was 
an avenue through which the United States could promote its free market system and gain 
other nations’ allegiance. It was therefore able to expand its economic and political 
influence and promote its global policy of containment, which attempted to prevent the 
expansion of communism. (McMichael 2004). The Marshall Plan saw great success as 
Europe and other non-European countries, like Japan, saw the restoration of their 
economies and the stabilization of trade (McMichael 2004). Moreover, the Marshall Plan 
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contributed to the further expansion of the global economic system. Technological and 
economic progress came to be experienced not on a national, but on an international level 
and transnational investment, development and exchange were further amplified. 
The second is the Bretton Woods system, a multilateral development project 
which sought to reconstruct the world economy in the 1940s by restoring trade, 
disbursing credit and liberalizing markets in areas that were devastated by the Second 
World War and colonialism (McMichael 2004). This was to be achieved through the 
creation of two main institutions. The first is the World Bank, whose function is to 
borrow money from international capital markets and invest it in the development of 
technology and infrastructure. The second is the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
whose function is to disburse credit in order to stabilize national finances and currency 
exchanges in order to promote international trade (McMichael 2004). The Bretton Woods 
system had the effect of stimulating the world economy, expanding international trade 
and development and increasing economic exchange between the First and Third World 
nations (McMichael 2004). As an outcome, technological and economic development 
took international dimensions, creating transnational, multilateral economic, political and 
social linkages. 
The post-World War II economic development projects had great success in 
restoring the world economy, the primary beneficiaries of which were Western nations. 
The 1950s and the 1960s were decades of continuous economic growth as national 
currencies and global trade stabilized. However, a different global reality emerged in the 
1970s – that of stunted economic growth, rising unemployment and high inflation (Cohen 
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and Centeno 2006). The economic uncertainty of the 1970s helped empower the 
emerging neo-liberal economic school of thought that would dominate the next three 
decades (Cohen and Centeno 2006). The main premises of economic neo-liberalism are 
that:  
• The role of the state must be reduced because national governments are wasteful and 
inefficient (Cohen and Centeno 2006). Government owned sectors of the economy should 
be privatized to ensure competition, motivation and innovation. This is expected to create 
wealth that will eventually trickle down to everyone in the country. 
• Conservative monetary and fiscal policies must be implemented. Government 
spending should be reduced to allow the economy to function freely. State programs such 
as welfare and subsidies should be eliminated (Cohen and Centeno 2006). 
• National markets should be deregulated to encourage direct foreign investment, 
especially from multinational companies (Cohen and Centeno 2006). This is expected to 
lead to global efficiency and specialization in production, and ensures the transnational 
flow of capital, workforce, raw material and products at lower costs. 
• Protectionist trade barriers such as tariffs and quotas should be eliminated (Cohen and 
Centeno 2006). This facilitates the free and efficient movement of goods and services 
between nation-states at unfettered prices. 
In the 1980s, the neo-liberal school of thought emerged as the most dominant 
(Cohen and Centeno 2006). The relentless advocacy for global economic liberalism by 
then U.S. president Ronald Regan and U.K. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher helped 
elevate neo-liberalism from an ideology to a global reality (Cohen and Centeno 2006). 
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Moreover, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank began implementing 
policies that were very much in accord with the neo-liberal school of thought (Cohen and 
Centeno 2006). More specifically, loans made by the World Bank and the IMF to Third 
World countries were tied to structural adjustment policies. These structural adjustment 
policies necessitated the liberalization of markets. Essentially, aid was only given to 
countries whose economic policies met the IMF’s and the World Bank’s standards of 
economic liberalism. This resulted in the implementation of neo-liberal economic 
policies, such as decreased assistance to the poor and reduction of subsidies to domestic 
businesses and farmers. Moreover, during the 1970s and 1980s, the World Bank and IMF 
along with private and national banks, lent immense amounts of money to Third World 
countries (McMichael 2004). These loans were used by elites to develop national 
infrastructure, strengthen militaries and enrich their networks with lucrative contracts 
(McMichael 2004). However, during the 1980s, the U.S. Federal Reserve, in an attempt 
to curtail the falling value of the dollar, aggressively reduced its money supply 
(McMichael 2004), the effect of which was the contraction of credit, higher interest rates 
and the issuance of shorter-term loans (McMichael 2004). This resulted in the Third 
World debt crisis, when poorer countries, given the new economic and loan conditions, 
were unable to pay back the immense amounts of money they borrowed. 
The combined effects of the Third World debt crisis and the concurrent 
implementation of neo-liberal economic policies had devastating economic consequences 
(Stiglitz 2002; McMichael 2004; Ganguly-Scrase and Vogl 2008). Until this day, the 
policies of the World Bank and the IMF are criticized and blamed for causing more 
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poverty in Third World countries and for working in favor of richer Western nations and 
companies at the expense of poorer countries. Suffice it to say, however, that 
international economic liberalism has been a contributing factor to increased poverty and 
greater economic inequality in both Western and Third World nations (Alderson and 
Nielsen 2002; McMichael 2004). For this reason, it is prudent to distinguish the 
phenomenon of economic globalization from its accompanying vice of global income 
disparity.  
Theoretically, there is nothing inherent in the phenomenon of globalization that 
presupposes increased poverty and economic inequality. In fact, the global economic 
system has both merits, an example being the global economic boom of the 1960s, and 
vices, an example being the global economic collapse of the 1930s. The adverse 
consequences of globalization can be attributed to many factors, ranging from the West’s 
historic control of world markets to the proliferation of neo-liberal economic practices. 
These factors have often been conflated with the notion of global economic 
interconnectivity. While it is clear that these factors might exist within the global 
economic system, they are not necessarily its equivalent. The global economic system 
can be considered a structural reality remnant of the post-colonial economic system – a 
reality that nation-states cannot ignore. Despite the negative effects of economic 
globalization, nation-states are unable to subsist outside the global economic system. It is 
for this reason that a recent Pew Global Attitudes survey found broad support for 
economic globalization throughout the world. Most notably, the survey found that sub-
Saharan Africa, the world’s poorest region, was strongly in favor of international trade, 
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with over 80% of the respondents stating that international trade was having a positive 
impact on their country (Kohut and Wike 2008). Therefore neo-liberalism is perhaps 
more accurately assessed not as the equivalent of globalization but rather, as one of its 
potentially malevolent counterparts. In essence, neo-liberal advocates take advantage of 
the reality of globalization in order to spread an economic ideology that often results in 
pervasive global economic disparity. 
Neo-liberalism’s greatest expansion followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
which had the consequent effect of empowering the West and globally reifying free 
market economics. The 1990s and the early 21
st
 century saw an ever increasing global 
trend toward global economic liberalism as more countries were integrated into the global 
economic system and as more countries implemented neo-liberal economic policies. This 
is reflected in the ratification of a series of international free trade agreements during that 
time, such as the General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs (finalized 1994), The North 
American Free Trade Agreement (enacted 1994), The Association of South East Asian 
Nations (signed 1992), The African Economic Community (enacted 1994), The Greater 
Arab Free Trade Area (adopted 1997), The Central European Free Trade Agreement 
(enacted 1994), The Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement 
(enacted 2006) and the Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (enacted 2003) (The 
African Economic Community 2010; The Association of South East Asian Nations 2010; 
World Trade Organization 2010). 
The culmination of these economic developments further contributed to the global 
integration of financial markets and to global economic interdependence (Castells 1996). 
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The self-sustained national economy ceased to be a reality in the 21
st
 century. The current 
study is structured against this backdrop of economic interdependence as a global milieu. 
More specifically, the current study is premised on the fact that global economic 
interconnectivity and interdependence have inadvertently, but surely, compromised 
national sovereignty (Habermas 1998a; Habermas 1998b; Falk 1999; Giddens 2000; 
Sassen 2006). The nation-state can no longer function adequately outside a globalized 
framework and, as a consequence, is subjected to external forces, pressures, dependencies 
and exposed to the volatility of the global economic system (Habermas 1998a; Habermas 
1998b; Falk 1999; Giddens 2000; Sassen 2006). These ideas are further explored in 
Chapter 3. 
 
Technology and Globalization 
Technological advancement can be considered the propellant of globalization. 
The unique characteristics of modern and post-modern technology, which have been 
constructed around their interface with the positive sciences, have furnished the 
infrastructure on which the globalizing structure and phenomena have been built. There 
are two historical facets of technological advancement and development that have 
propelled the phenomenon of globalization.  
The first are the technological advancements of modernity in the 19
th
 and early 
20
th
 century in Europe during the Industrial Revolution. This period saw the 
transformation of agricultural and manual labor production to mechanically-based 
manufacturing (Ellul 1964; Goff et al. 1998). Several key inventions and scientific 
advancements contributed to this technological progress: 
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• The increased and efficient use of refined coal which, for the first time, allowed for 
the production of immense amounts of energy (Toffler 1980); 
• The invention and refinement of steam power and the steam engine (Toffler 1980; 
Goff et al. 1998); 
• More sophisticated utilization of water wheels and powered machinery (Toffler 
1980); 
• The invention of electricity and electric light (Toffler 1980; Goff et al. 1998); 
• The invention of telecommunications such as the telephone and the telegraph (Goff et 
al. 1998). 
These advancements facilitated the mechanization of production industries (Toffler 
1980). Mechanized production was pioneered by the textile industry and was eventually 
also adopted by other sectors of production. Moreover, these advancements in technology 
allowed for rapid trade expansion both within Europe and between Europe and its 
colonies through the introduction of steam boats, improved roads, railways and canals 
(Toffler 1980). As trade expanded globally, so did technological advancement. 
Therefore, global technological development can be thought of as a derivative of 
the dialectical relationship between technology and capitalism (Ellul 1964). In essence, 
the already established system of global economic exchange necessitated technological 
advancement in the form of more efficient ways of production, communication and 
transportation. As technology expanded and advanced globally, so did global economic 
exchange (Toffler 1980). This created a global system of economic interdependences 
contingent on and facilitated by modern technology (Toffler 1980).  
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The second phase of technological innovation, which further propelled the 
phenomenon of globalization, occurred in the mid-twentieth century. The 1960s and 
1970s saw the advent of a new wave of technological development centered on 
information technologies. This movement was pioneered primarily by the United States. 
It was driven by an emerging culture that emphasized and valued technological 
innovation, and by the challenges put forth by an increasingly growing and demanding 
global system of economic exchange, communication, management and production. 
During this time, the technological advancements that had the greatest impact on the 
proliferation of technology, communication and global interconnectivity were: 
• The invention of microelectronics such as transistors, integrated circuits and 
microprocessors, enabling communication with and between machines (Castells 1996); 
• The creation of general-purpose, commercial and personal computers, enabling the 
spread of information technology (Castells 1996); 
• The standardization of computers, such as the creation of operating systems, enabling 
the interconnectivity of information technology and communication between parties 
(Castells 1996); 
• The creation of network systems wherein multiple client computers are integrated 
around a more powerful and specialized server computer, enabling the capability of 
instantaneous interactive data sharing (Castells 1996); 
• Advances in telecommunications, such as in optoelectronics, digital packet 
transmission, satellite broadcasting, microwaves, digital telephony technology and so 
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forth, enabling faster and more diverse avenues for communication and dissemination of 
information (Castells 1996); 
• The invention of the internet, elevating interconnectivity, communication and 
information dissemination to an unprecedented level. 
These technological advancements resulted in an existential paradigm shift, 
primarily in the West and eventually throughout the rest of the globe. Electronic 
technology has redefined economics, societies, communities, politics and cultures. As 
Castells notes, “A technological revolution, centered on information technologies, is 
reshaping, at accelerated pace, the material basis of society” (Castells 1996:1). Moreover, 
post-modern technology has allowed for an unprecedented level of interconnectivity and 
ease of communication and information sharing that has elevated the phenomenon of 
globalization to an existential milieu. As McMichael suggests, in regards to economics, 
“Advances in telecommunication technologies enable firms, headquartered in global 
cities such as New York, London, or Tokyo, to coordinate production tasks distributed 
across sites in several countries” (McMichael 2008:83). The spread of information 
technology has not only accelerated the rate by which the world is globalized, but has 
also changed the way globalization is experienced. 
Technology has allowed for a more intimate, dialectic experience between the 
individual and the forces of globalization. As Castells suggests, “networks are growing 
exponentially, creating new forms and channels of communication, shaping life and 
being shaped by life at the same time” (Castells 1996:2). Recent events in Iran serve as 
testimony to this statement during the country’s globally publicized anti-government 
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protests in the aftermath of disputed presidential elections. The Iranian government, in an 
attempt to save its global reputation and maintain its stronghold over its citizens, had 
successfully blocked foreign media from entering the country and had virtually barred 
any media outlets from broadcasting the events overseas. However, it was unable to 
block its citizens’ utilization of online social networks, such as Twitter, to disseminate 
vast amounts of information and media about the protests (Batty 2009). These events 
illustrate not only how interconnected the world has become due to technology, but also 
how dependent it has become on technology. This interplay of global interconnectivity 
and technological dependency has generated a new form of consciousness – one that is 
defined by globalized phenomena via the medium of technology. This global 
consciousness carries cultural implications that should be considered. 
 
Cultural Implications 
Cultural globalization can be thought of as the intensification of global 
interactions and relations among people (Giddens 2000; Lagos 2003). These interactions 
can occur on many levels. For instance, they can occur on a personal basis. An example 
would be business professionals of different nationalities meeting for common purposes 
and interests. Another example would be that of an immigrant coming into contact and 
interacting with local nationals. These sorts of interactions facilitate the inter-cultural 
flow of language, ideas, reasoning, methods and culture. An immigrant forming relations 
and friendships with local nationals might, for example, share and pass on traditional 
food recipes.  
 
23 
 
Interactions in a globalized world, however, extend far beyond personal 
interaction. Interactions can take place via various other channels of communication such 
as economic exchange, technology, media, politics, pop culture and so forth. In all cases, 
these interactions impact and affect culture. Consider the September 11
th 
attacks on the 
World Trade Center and its implementation and impact on U.S. and world culture. This 
event was partly facilitated by the global interconnectivity of communication, economic 
exchange and technology, which enabled the terrorists to fund, coordinate and implement 
their plans of attack. In the aftermath of the attacks, the event was instantaneously 
transmitted and delivered to virtually every part of the U.S. and the rest of the globe. The 
effects on U.S. and global culture were broad and long-lasting. In the U.S., the attacks 
resulted in widespread national grief and terror, coupled with an exaggerated sense of 
national pride and militancy. The result was the consequent invasion of Afghanistan and 
Iraq and a reconfigured international political strategy characterized by pre-emptive strike 
and military dominance. In considering the impact of the September 11
th
 attacks on world 
culture, one can say with conviction that the terrorist attacks induced a global feeling of 
sympathy toward the U.S. (NZ Herald 2001). This enabled the U.S. to put together an 
international military coalition and to invade Afghanistan. 
What becomes increasingly clear is that the forces of globalization are so 
pervasive and strong that they have the capacity to transform the way individuals 
experience themselves, their communities, their cultures and ultimately the rest of the 
world. As Edwards suggests, interactions in the framework of globalization change “how 
actors perceive themselves and their interests” (Edwards 2006:588). In other words, there 
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is a shift in people’s consciousness. In this sense, cultural globalization is of a more 
qualitative, nebulous and implicit nature. In assessing Western cultural hegemony, about 
which much has been said and written, consider the example of a youngster growing up 
in a traditional society but who also has access to the global media, either through 
television or the internet. In the process of this individual’s development it is more likely 
that he or she will espouse both the values of his or her immediate, traditional community 
and those of the West, which tend to dominate the global media. As Castells suggests, 
“[…]a new communication system, increasingly speaking a universal, digital language is 
both integrating globally the production and distribution of words, sounds, and images of 
our culture and customizing them to the tastes of identities and moods of individuals” 
(Castells 1996:2). 
In this sense, one can see how the forces of globalization have also generated a 
global culture; better yet, something that resembles culture. This cultural wave has been, 
for the most part, led by the West and spread through global capitalism, technology and 
the media (Berger 2000). This emerging form of culture is of a post-modern quality – 
deconstructed, non-referential, abstract and of multiple and conflicting dimensions. This 
is a radical departure from culture conceived in the conventional sense which entails art, 
norms, customs, and behaviors rooted in years of history, social consensus and 
interaction. This new form of global culture can be conceived as the continuous 
establishment of ephemeral values, trends, lifestyles, norms, art and behaviors.  
Consider the example of hip-hop music and culture. This form of art was at some 
point uniquely localized and specific to African Americans and was generated through a 
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unique collective experience – that of slavery, segregation and racialized poverty in the 
U.S. Nonetheless, hip-hop, as an art form, culture and behavior has spread throughout the 
globe and has been adopted by individuals whose experience is far removed from that of 
African Americans. To use a comparison, if we were to conceive of culture in the 
conventional, traditional sense, this would be the equivalent of a Belgian adopting the 
mannerisms and expressions of an Italian! Another poignant example of how values are 
adopted on a global scale is the recent surge in environmental consciousness (Falk 1999; 
Giddens 2000), partly attributed to the fact that environmental change is an issue of 
global effects and implications. Environmental activists and scientists have cooperated on 
a global scale and have had a huge impact on mainstream environmental politics (Falk 
1999). This was made possible through the utilization of global media, communication 
and culture. Thus, it becomes increasingly clear that cultural globalization is contingent 
on technology, the media and economic exchange, all of which can be thought of as the 
facilitators and vehicles of interaction. 
 
Political Consequences 
A system of global economic, cultural and technological interconnectivity gives 
rise to a global political sphere. Governments are intrinsically tied to the economic and 
technological infrastructure of their countries in the forms of regulation, management, 
oversight, execution and so forth. Globalization extends the economic and technological 
infrastructure beyond the borders of nation-states via economic liberalization and 
technological interconnectivity and, as a result, so does the reach of the government. The 
 
26 
 
outcome is the emergence of a global political sphere and transnational political action 
and interaction (Falk 1999).  
This occurs in several ways. The simplest example is the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between countries where issues such as economic exchange, tourism 
and travel and financial assistance can be jointly addressed. Another example is the 
establishment of joint technological projects between countries, such as the creation of 
cross-border gas or oil pipelines. For instance, Ukraine and Russia collaboratively 
administer a cross-border gas line which transfers natural gas from Russia through 
Ukraine to Europe. 
Increasingly though, the global political sphere necessitates political action 
between multiple political actors because the globalized economic, social, political and 
technological system has become so complex and volatile that it cannot be managed 
unilaterally (Habermas 1998a; Falk 1999; Giddens 2000). The perfect example of this is 
the European Union, a system of political, economic and social exchange, in which 
issues, policies and laws are proposed, addressed and ratified on a collective level.   
Globalization poses two basic challenges for nation-states. The first is how to 
manage the effects of globalization. The nature of the phenomenon is such that the 
occurrence of distant events can have significant, and in some cases, severe effects on the 
nation-state (Falk 1999; Giddens 2000). Iceland’s recent financial turmoil serves as proof 
to this assertion. In 2008, it essentially went bankrupt as a consequence of the U.S. 
housing and credit crisis (Associated Press 2008). Therefore, part of the role of the 
national government is to effectively manage its political, economic and technological 
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constitution in relation to the rest of the world in order to ensure the survival and progress 
of the nation-state. The second challenge of the nation-state is to preserve its local 
distinctiveness. Globalization has the capacity to transform the way individual actors 
perceive themselves, their societies, their communities and ultimately the rest of the 
world. As a result, nation-states feel threatened and overwhelmed by globalization 
because it has the potential to be accompanied by external influence. This sense of threat 
becomes more salient as individuals and communities actually experience the erosion of 
their local distinctiveness. This fear translates itself into the political realm both in 
benevolent and malevolent ways. In either case, the government is given the task of 
preserving local distinctiveness and managing the impact of globalization.  
One can see how the issue of national sovereignty is central to both challenges. 
As will be explored later, the pervasive forces of globalization have the tendency to 
compromise national sovereignty. The manner in which nation-states react to this reality 
is central to the current study.  
What proceeds in the following sections is an exploration of the intricate 
complexities of the nation, the state and their convergence. There are three key 
conceptual elements that are useful in understanding their connection: national 
institutions, national consciousness and national sovereignty. 
 
ational Institutions, ational Consciousness and ational Sovereignty 
National institutions are the public institutions of a nation-state that facilitate and 
assist in the implementation of its structural social, political, economic, legal and 
bureaucratic processes. The systemic convergences of these institutions generate the state 
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apparatus – the legitimate representative and manifestation of the nation. The nation-state 
system as an organizational apparatus has come to define Europe (and ultimately the rest 
of the globe) ever since the advent of modernity in the 19
th
 century (Wallerstein 1999; 
Sassen 2006). As mentioned earlier, Europe experienced exponential technological 
progress and economic growth during this time and, as a consequence, rapid urban 
expansionism. In essence, growth in industrial production necessitated increases in labor 
force and consumer markets. As Ellul points out, “a crowd of human beings began to 
gather about the machine. A great number of individuals were necessary to service it; an 
equally great number were required to collect about it to consume its products[…] With 
this development came the hitherto unknown phenomenon of the big city” (Ellul 
1964:113).  
What followed was the emergence of mass culture, characterized by mass 
industries, large urban centers, mass communications and mass transportations. These 
newly generated mass societal structures could not be managed by traditional social 
institutions, such as those of the family and the immediate community. Ellul suggests that 
individuals did not spontaneously adapt to this new form of mass society (Ellul 1964). 
Instead, this necessitated the creation of a mass and highly integrated organizational 
system – the territorially defined modern state apparatus. As such, the state came to be 
experienced as a vehicle that ensured the well-being of the general populace (Sassen 
2006). But what enabled the state apparatus’ emergence, actualized through the collective 
agency of the people it represented, is a concurrent emergence of a collective national 
consciousness (Anderson 1983; Deutsch 1996). 
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Anderson traces the roots of this emergence to the Protestant Reformation and the 
rise of print-capitalism, both of which had a considerable effect in reshaping the 
traditional values and social structures of Europe (Anderson 1983). The Protestant 
Reformation had the effect of eroding the Catholic Church’s absolute standing which, in 
turn, compromised the societal continuity that had been sustained by Christendom for 
centuries through religion. Much of the Protestant Reformation’s impact can be attributed 
to the availability of print, which allowed for the mass production and circulation of 
vernacular biblical translations. Prior to the invention of the printing press, the bible had 
been written in Latin and was only made accessible through religious institutions. Its 
content and interpretation was therefore only available through the religious leadership. 
The publication of the bible in vernacular languages eroded the power of the Catholic 
Church, which lost its vantage as the exclusive mediator between the collective 
consciousness and the religious text (Anderson 1983). 
 Moreover, print-capitalism had the effect of reducing the number of languages in 
Europe, as well as their respective dialects, through homogenization. Prior to the printing 
press, people speaking the same language often found it difficult if not impossible to 
communicate due to variances in dialect. With the advent of print, however, came the 
creation of standardized syntax and grammar. Coupled with the fact that books could be 
produced and distributed at an astounding rate, people from different regions found that 
they could now communicate through print. As Anderson points out, “These fellow-
readers, to whom they were connected through print, formed, in their secular, particular, 
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visible invisibility, the embryo of the nationally imagined community.” (Anderson 
1983:44). 
However, it was not until the 19
th
 century that national consciousness emerged in 
its definitive form. Prior to the industrial revolution and the advent of mass society, social 
reality was personal, intimate and, most importantly, manageable by traditional 
institutions. Individuals were closer and more intimate to the instruments of social 
organization, those being the family, church and immediate community. The collective 
consciousness was fostered within this intimate framework and, conventionally, affirmed 
through the practice of religious rituals (Durkheim 1915). Through religious worship, the 
community was essentially reifying its morals, values, beliefs and norms and, essentially, 
reinforcing the collective consciousness (Durkheim 1915).  
However, the advent of mass society saw the erosion of the family and the 
immediate community as social organizational instruments. This necessitated new and 
larger mechanisms of social organization that were structurally relevant to the industrially 
induced massification of society. The result was the advent of the modern state apparatus 
as a system of social integration. However, this created a social experience wherein 
individuals were far removed from the social organizational instruments, manifested in a 
faceless and abstract state apparatus. Moreover, as a consequence of mass society, 
individuals became part of a social order that extended far beyond their immediate social 
environments. 
This necessitated an alternative collective consciousness – one which 
encompassed a vast and integrated mass society. The result was the emergence of a 
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collective ethnic national consciousness. As Smith points out, “National identity fuses the 
socio-cultural properties of a community with its political order and its territorial habitat. 
Through myths of autonomy, fraternity and authenticity, nationalism creates the only 
credible popular basis for large-scale social and political units.” (Smith 1993:9). Similar 
to its traditional counterpart of religion, this new form of collective consciousness is 
reified through collective self-worship via rituals, myths, symbolic imagery and social 
institutionalization, now centered on the nation-state (Anderson 1983; Smith 1993). 
What follows is an abstract and highly perceptual collective mental process 
wherein the state-apparatus is experientially fused with a heightened collective national 
consciousness to formulate the notion and the experience of the nation-state. This is a 
process in which the collective consciousness experientially converges with the structural 
realities put forth by the state apparatus, functioning as an all-encompassing parent figure 
and guarantor of social security and functionality.  This instigates feelings of collective 
security, solidarity and agency, and the collective self is reaffirmed via the state apparatus 
and a mass social order.  
The culmination of these experiences and circumstances gave rise to a 
phenomenon that has since come to define the human experience: nationalism. 
Nationalism is a world view that presupposes the superiority of the nation-state 
(Anastasiou 2008b). Anastasiou defines it as “the unprecedented moral absolutization of 
the nation, its freedom, its interest, its community, its identity, and its power, in 
combination with the derivative presumption that its supreme moral status furnishes 
thereby ‘the right’ to employ all means, including adversarial and lethal means, in the 
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nation’s defense, sustenance, advancement, expanding powers, and alleged ‘destined’ 
historical realization” (Anastasiou 2008b:32). 
Paradoxically, the absolutization of the nation’s values and power and its right to 
exercise force (nationalists conceive this as the legitimate use of violence) is practiced 
not only against people of other nations but also against its own people when the agents 
of nationalism deem it necessary. Throughout the past two hundred years, numberless 
horrors and cruelties have been committed in the name of the nation-state (Smith 1993; 
Goff et al. 1998). Most, if not all, wars in recent history have been fought in the name of 
the nation. Ironically, even the cruelest acts committed by states against their own people 
were done in the name of the nation. 
By implication, nationality entails an effective way of ensuring behavioral control 
over the nation’s members (Deutsch 1996). Any deviation from the prescribed standards 
is confronted with sanctions. The nation-state represents a uniquely exaggerated social 
power structure which has the power to legitimately intervene in every aspect of peoples’ 
lives – the family, the community, the education system, the private sector, the public 
sector, politics and so forth. The nation-state exists much like an invisible force, dictating 
thought, prescribing action and motivating the masses. While social relations have always 
existed through power structures, there is something qualitatively and quantitatively 
different about how power is instated and imposed in a nation-state system (Deutsch 
1996).  
This reality is rooted in the fact that rigid and definitive structures of power that 
can be effectively implemented in the entire spectrum of society are necessitated by 
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modernism and mass society by virtue of their complexity and size. What results, is the 
granting of exaggerated and absolute power to the state apparatus along with the ability to 
exercise its power through sophisticated techniques and technological means. 
Nationalism rationalizes this vulgar display of power by infusing historic, social and, at 
times, religious moralisms and mythical narratives into the collective conscience, thusly 
conflating and equating moral action with state efficacy. This process is then 
institutionalized through “informal social arrangements, pressure of group opinion, and 
the prestige of national symbols” (Deutsch 1996:28). Power in this sense can be exercised 
more strongly and more effectively “through formal social or political organizations, 
through the administration of educational or economic institutions, or through the 
machinery of government” (Deutsch 1996:28). In other words, nationalism has come to 
define the collective and individual consciousness by defining social force relations, 
either explicitly or implicitly. 
The nation-state, however, should not be understood as a social entity abstracted 
from the agency of individuals. It is the will and support of the people that enable the 
efficacy of the nation-state in sustaining the social normative order. However, the 
executive, legislative and ideological structures of the nation-state are ultimately 
prescribed by a small group of powerful nationals, which includes high level politicians, 
economic elites, the intelligentsia and the military. In fact, the emergence of nation-states 
was, in addition to what was delineated earlier in this section, driven by the economic and 
power interests of this elite group of nationals.  
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Compared to the average citizen, these power elites have a disproportionately 
greater capacity to utilize the state apparatus due to their status and social, political and 
economic advantages. Often, they do so in their own interests and at the expense of the 
larger population. Government corruption is the most prevalent example. War driven by 
economic consideration is the most perverse. Their deeds are masked, more than anything 
else, by the nationalistic and ideological value systems and narrative that they themselves 
prescribe to the broader populace. This diverts citizens’ attention from the elites’ 
transgressions to ideological abstractions (such patriotism, national loyalty and national 
interest) that have extremely powerful symbolic significance in the context of 
nationalism. Nationalism can thus be conceived as an extremely powerful tool in social 
engineering that has the capacity to be used for both benevolent and malevolent purposes, 
depending on the nation’s leadership. One issue that has long been used to motivate and 
distract the masses is national sovereignty. 
The emergence of the nation-state is intrinsically tied to a collective rigid 
conceptualization of national sovereignty (Sassen 2006). National sovereignty can be 
understood as the perceived supreme and absolute authority of the nation-state, embodied 
by its independence, to manage, regulate and define all its affairs and aspects which are 
either tangibly contained within its visible borders or that are intrinsically or extrinsically 
related to its invisible mental reach (Krasner 2001; Rankin 2001). In practice, this entails 
state intervention and imposed control in potentially every aspect of social life including 
the economy, the national border, education, family and even social interaction, to serve 
the nation-state’s interest. Ellul agrees with this assertion by pointing out that “The 
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technological revolution meant the emergence of a state that was truly conscious of itself 
and was autonomous in relation to anything that did not serve its interest” (Ellul 
1964:43). 
What is clear is that this absolute conception of national sovereignty is a direct 
derivative of nationalism. More specifically, rigid conceptions of national sovereignty 
can be linked to the absolutization of the nation-state, coupled with the supposition that 
the nation-state has the inherent right and capacity to define all its associations without 
being subjected to or controlled by any external forces.  
The current study is centered on the subject matter of national sovereignty. 
Specifically, what will be explored is the interplay between national sovereignty, as a 
derivative of nationalism, and economic globalization. Indeed, the nation-state system, 
along with nationalism and the derivative assumption of national sovereignty, has come 
to define modernity and post-modernity as we know it. The only system of social 
organization that has taken exception to and has challenged this system is the EU. 
 
The European Union 
 The European Union is a political, economic and social union comprised of 27 
member states (Europa 2009). Since its establishment, the EU has striven for cooperation 
and solidarity to prevent poverty and international conflict and to promote unity and 
fraternity among its member states (Anastasiou 2008a; Europa 2009). These principles 
are premised on the rule of law, security and justice, peace and stability, diversity and 
economic and social solidarity (Europa 2009). From an economic standpoint, the EU is a 
single market trading bloc that guarantees free trade between its member states through 
 
36 
 
the elimination of protectionist barriers, such as tariffs and quotas (McCormick 2005; 
Wood and Yesilada 2006). For example, French automakers can sell their cars to Austria 
without being subject to any form of tariffs, as though they were Austrian automakers. 
From a social standpoint, the EU guarantees freedom of mobility (travel and migration), 
work and education between its member states (McCormick 2005; Wood and Yesilada 
2006). For example, within the EU, a Cypriot national can work in Germany with 
virtually no restrictions, as though he or she were actually German. 
 To better understand the EU, one must consider Europe’s modern history and, 
specifically, its long-lasting political, economic and social turmoil and continuous 
warfare. Furthermore, it is important to comprehend the pervasive historical significance 
of nationalism in Europe, particularly in light of its World War II evolution. Modern-day 
Europe can be characterized by peace, stability and solidarity but this was not always the 
case. In fact, in modern history, Europe had been continuously entrenched in warfare, up 
until the end of the Second World War.  
 The treacherous and catastrophic events of WWII had a profound impact on 
Europe and had the effect of steering it into a new direction. It is, therefore, no surprise 
that the official EU website explicitly states that “The European Union is set up with the 
aim of ending the frequent and bloody wars between neighbours, which culminated in the 
Second World War” (Europa 2009). However, what we now know as the EU is not 
merely a result of the realization that peace and solidarity should take precedence over 
war and conflict. Rather, the EU is also the outcome of decades of highly reflective 
deliberations and initiatives that had the capacity of institutionalizing peace and 
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cooperation. It primarily emerged as an economic project whose aim was to promote 
unity among its member states through economic integration and through the elimination 
of hunger and poverty. In this sense, the genesis of the EU can be considered to have 
been heavily incentivized by economic considerations. This holds true for both the 
political and economic leaders who propelled the project but also for the general 
populace that granted its support. These collective decisions were heavily influenced by 
The Great Depression of the 1930s, which had the effect of generating extremely adverse 
social and political conditions in Europe. But the EU has since moved beyond simply 
economic integration to social and political integration. What follows is a brief outline of 
the history and evolution of the EU. 
 In 1950, the European Coal and Steel Community was founded by Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, placing coal and steel 
production under joint authority. This was the first step toward European economic and 
political unity as an attempt to avert future conflict and to secure peace (Europa 2009). 
 The 1960s saw a surge in economic growth and expansion as members of the 
European Coal and Steel community opened up their economies and eliminated trade 
barriers. In 1968 the Common Agricultural Policy was established, granting joint control 
over food production to its members to eliminate waste and hunger (Europa 2009). 
 On January 1
st
 1973, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the 
European common market. The EU’s regional policy transferred large amounts of money 
and capital to poorer areas for job creation and infrastructure development. During this 
time, Europe saw its last right-wing dictatorships come to an end with the overthrow of 
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the Salazar regime in Portugal in 1974 and the death of General Franco of Spain in 1975 
(Europa 2009).  
 In 1981, Greece became the 10
th
 member to join the EU and in 1986, Spain and 
Portugal followed suit. In 1987 the Single European Act was signed, enabling the free-
flow of trade between EU member states’ borders and creating the European ‘Single 
Market’. On November 9
th
 1989, there was major political upheaval when the Berlin 
Wall was pulled down and in October of 1990 Germany was united for the first time in 
28 years (Europa 2009). 
 The collapse of the Iron Curtain brought forth new challenges as well as 
opportunities for the EU. In an attempt to reconcile with their neighbors, the EU and 
Eastern Europe agreed to multilateral arms reduction. The EU began investing in Eastern 
Europe in an attempt to elevate their standard of living so that they can later have the 
opportunity to accede into the EU (Europa 2009). 
 In 1992, The Maastricht Treaty was ratified, extending the powers of the EU 
beyond the economic realm. In 1993 the ‘Single Market’ was completed, further opening 
up borders with the free movement of goods, services, people and money. Moreover, in 
1995, Austria, Finland and Sweden acceded into the EU. In 1999 The Treaty of 
Amsterdam was ratified and, in an attempt to strengthen citizenship, individual rights and 
democracy, increased the power of the European Parliament (Europa 2009). 
 In the period following the new millennium, the euro, a single transnational 
European currency, became the currency for most EU countries. The political and social 
divisions between Eastern and Western Europe ceased to be a reality when in 2004 eight 
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central and eastern European countries joined the EU: The Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. Additionally, the island of 
Cyprus and Malta also became EU members (Europa 2009). The year 2007 concluded the 
accession process with the inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania (Europa 2009).  
 What is important to consider is that the EU is the only supranational organization 
in the world. Its structure is unlike that of international organizations, such as the United 
Nations. International organizations such as these are inter-governmental in their 
structure and presuppose the “voluntary cooperation and coordination between or among 
its members, but has neither autonomous powers nor the authority to impose its rulings 
on its members” (McCormick 2005:4). The EU is a supranational organization whose 
structure of governance also entails transnational authority and powers configured in a 
system of shared national sovereignty. In essence, when a country joins the EU, it gives 
up a portion of its national sovereignty due to the fact that EU law, on various issues, 
supersedes national law, as is the case with environmental, economic and human rights 
laws. For example, Turkey’s ambitions to join the EU were hampered when it failed to 
adhere to the EU’s freedom of movement laws when it blocked its air and sea ports to 
Cyprus (Euronews 2006). Moreover, the EU system is set up so that there is shared 
control and a balance of power, not just between constituent nations, but between the 
union itself, its member states and its citizens. This process is elaborated and 
implemented by its three main institutions. 
  The European Commission is the executive branch of the EU, representing the 
common good of the EU as whole. It is often referred to as the “conscience of the EU”. 
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The European Commission has three main functions:  to suggest and propose new 
legislation and policies; to ensure the implementation of new legislation after it has been 
ratified and to promote the interest of the EU integration process (McCormick 2005). As 
McCormick points out, “It is the most supranational of the EU institutions, and has not 
only encouraged member states to harmonize their laws, regulations and standards in the 
interests of removing barriers to trade, but has been the source of some of the most 
important policy initiations since the 1960s, including the single market programme and 
the development of the euro” (McCormick 2005:82). However, it is important to note that 
even though the European Commission has the power to suggest and introduce legislation 
and policy, it does not have the power to ratify it. That power rests with the Council of 
Ministers and the European Parliament. 
  The Council of Ministers is the intergovernmental legislative branch of the EU 
(McCormick 2005). It is the body that negotiates and ratifies bills that have been 
introduced by the European Commission. The Council of Ministers, unlike the European 
Commission, represents the individual interests of the EU’s 27 member states 
(McCormick 2005). As McCormick points out, “The Council of Ministers is the major 
decision making branch of the EU, the primary champion of national interests, and 
arguably the most powerful of the EU institutions” (McCormick 2005:89). The legislative 
process takes place via inter-governmental negotiation and compromise. This process is 
elaborated by state ministers and diplomats in nine distinct councils, determined by the 
topic under consideration (McCormick 2005). For example, finance ministers meet to 
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discuss economic issues while foreign ministers meet to discuss issues regarding external 
policy. 
  The European Parliament is the supranational legislative branch of the EU, 
representing the citizens of the EU (McCormick 2005). It consists of political parties that 
have multinational representation. For example, the European Parliament’s Green Party 
can have representatives from Belgium, Cyprus, Romania, France and Estonia. These 
representatives, unlike those of the European Commission and the Council of Ministers, 
are directly elected by EU citizens. In this sense, the European Parliament can be 
considered the most democratic of all EU institutions. Over the years, the European 
Parliament has successfully managed to accumulate more powers. As it stands, the 
European Parliament has legislative and budgetary authorities and oversight power over 
the Union’s institutions (Europa 2009). In essence, EU legislation is based on cooperative 
decisions by the EU Parliament and the Council of Ministers. 
  It is clear that the EU is a unique economic and socio-political system in many 
respects. Perhaps, though, what is most unique about the EU is the fact that it is a system 
consciously constructed in response to globalization. Central to the present study is EU 
citizens’ unique experience of globalization through the EU. As previously mentioned, 
the EU is an intergovernmental and supranational system of shared sovereignty. This 
alters the experience of globalization due to the fact that, in participating in a system of 
shared national sovereignty, the experience of the nation-state takes on a supranational 
dimension. The EU also functions as a buffer against the vices of globalization by 
increasing the collective power and efficacy of its member states. Moreover, it has 
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redefined the meaning of citizenship in Europe by granting supranational democratic 
rights to its citizens, thereby expanding the experience of the citizen beyond borders. The 
relationship between EU citizens, the EU and globalization will be explored in greater 
detail in Chapter 3. What proceeds is an assessment and exploration of the determinant 
factors of opinion of globalization through previous literature. 
 
Determinant Factors of Opinion of Globalization 
The phenomenon of globalization has evoked considerable academic interest in 
recent years. In the last decade, there has been an increasing trend particularly in 
observing peoples’ opinions of, and attitudes toward, globalization. What follows is a 
literature review examining the determinant factors of opinion of globalization. From a 
theoretical standpoint, the following section elicits insight and understanding of how 
people perceive and form judgments about globalization. Methodologically, it generates 
an array of control variables that are used in the analysis to counter spuriousness 
(expanded on in Chapter 4).  
Additionally, due to the study’s focus on the EU, literature examining opinion of 
EU integration is also assessed. The EU can be considered a construct that mediates 
national attachment and globalization. As has been mentioned and is expanded on in 
Chapter 3, EU citizens experience the phenomenon of globalization through the EU, a 
supranational, intergovernmental institutional response to the phenomenon of 
globalization. For this reason, it is prudent to examine the determinant factors of EU 
integration opinion because, as mediating factors, they might influence EU citizens’ 
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opinion of globalization. This is done to elicit greater theoretical understanding of what 
shapes EU citizens’ opinion of globalization.  
Several studies indicate that higher levels of education are generally positively 
correlated with support for trade integration (Rankin 2001; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; 
Mayda and Rodrik 2005). This relationship is generally stronger in wealthier countries 
and either weakened or reversed in poorer countries (Mayda and Rodrik 2005). Another 
demographic determinant is average wage or income, which is generally positively 
correlated with support for trade integration (Scheve and Slaughter 2001). For example, 
Mayda and Rodrik find that individuals whose income is higher than the national average 
tend to be in favor of trade integration while those at the bottom end of income 
distribution tend to have a protectionist outlook (Mayda and Rodrik 2005). Skill level is 
also positively correlated with greater support for trade integration (Scheve and Slaughter 
2001). However, as is the case with education, this relationship holds true for wealthy 
nations and is either weakened or reversed in poorer nations (O’Rourke and Sinnott 2001; 
Mayda and Rodrik 2005).  
There are several possible explanations for the above findings. Trade integration 
generally benefits wealthier nations and wealthier individuals and, in certain instances, 
generates adverse social and economic conditions for less economically developed 
countries and poorer individuals (Alderson and Nielsen 2002; Stiglitz 2002; Ganguly-
Scrase and Vogl 2008; Meschi and Vivarelli 2009). Wealthier countries and individuals 
with higher levels of education, skill level and income, all of which are positively 
correlated, are in a better position to benefit from trade integration and are thus in favor 
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of it. However, this relationship is reversed in poorer countries. Poorer countries are more 
vulnerable to the effects of free trade. Hence, individuals of higher income, education and 
skill level who reside in poorer countries tend to be against trade integration because of 
the fact that they are conscious of this vulnerability.  
Age is another predictor of opinion of globalization. A Eurobarometer survey on 
opinion of globalization finds that younger respondents tend to be in favor of 
globalization (Eurobarometer 2003). Mayda and Rodrik and Edwards find similar trends 
in regards to age, in that older individuals tend to have more protectionist attitudes and 
are more skeptical of globalization (Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Edwards 2006). However, 
other studies suggest that age is neither a predictor of trade liberalization nor of 
supranational ties (Rankin 2001).  
Findings linking age with opinion of globalization are typically attributed to a 
recent emergence of supranational conceptions of identity and the development of a post-
national global consciousness, typically more prevalent among youths (Jung 2008). More 
education in foreign languages and greater rates of travel to foreign countries are a 
contributing factor (Jamieson 2005). Moreover, the internet, global popular culture icons, 
exposure to global news media and the rise of international consumer brands have had the 
effect of connecting youths around the globe (Jung 2008). This has had the effect of 
deteriorating traditional rigid conceptions of national identity and paving the way for 
supranationalism and embrace of globalization. 
There is also a gender gap when it comes to opinion of globalization (O’Rourke 
and Sinnott 2001). Steve and Slaughter and Mayda and Rodrik, for example, find that 
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women tend to be more protectionist than men (Steve and Slaughter 2001; Mayda and 
Rodrik 2005). There are several possible explanations for this. Globalization has 
generated economic conditions disproportionately favoring men (Boserup 2007). For 
example, Sassen observes that while large scale service industries like finance are run by 
men on the executive level, they are supported and sustained by low paid, manual 
workers, many of whom are women (Sassen 1996). Globalization and neo-liberalism 
have also generated vulnerable social and economical conditions for women such as 
forced migration, reduction in health services, sex trafficking and increased 
impoverishment (Sassen 2000; Ganguly-Scrase and Vogl 2008). 
Occupational sector has also shown to predict opinions of trade integration. 
Rankin finds that blue collar workers are more likely to be against trade integration and 
NAFTA (Rankin 2001). Mayda and Rodrik find that individuals in both the import and 
export sector of the economy are against free trade but that those in the export sector have 
less of a tendency to be against trade integration (Mayda and Rodrik 2005). Steve and 
Slaugher, however, find little evidence for the claim that occupational sector predicts 
opinion of trade integration (Steve and Slaugher 2001).  
Trade union membership has also been found to predict trade integration. There is 
a tendency for trade union member to be against globalization (Mayda and Rodrik 2005). 
For example, Rankin finds that trade union members are both against trade integration 
and NAFTA (Rankin 2001). Locality is also proven to be a predictor of opinion of 
globalization. Mayda and Rodrik, for example, find that individuals living in rural areas 
are more likely to be of a protectionist outlook (Mayda and Rodrik 2005). 
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 Other studies have shown that values predict opinion of globalization. In a cross-
national survey, Edwards finds that individuals deeply rooted in their traditional way of 
life tend to have an unfavorable view of globalization because they feel threatened by its 
invasive effects (Edwards 2006). Edwards also finds that individuals who have negative 
views of consumerism are more likely to be against globalization (Edwards 2006). There 
have been conflicting findings on whether partisanship plays a role in predicting opinion 
of globalization. Mayda and Rodrik, after controlling for various variables, find that 
political party affiliation has no effect on trade integration preferences (Mayda and 
Rodrik 2005). On the other hand, Steve and Slaughter find that in the U.S., Democrats 
(left) systematically express more protectionist opinions compared to Republicans (right) 
(Steve and Slaughter 2001). Rankin finds a similar trend wherein Republicans (right) 
tend to be in favor of free trade compared to Democrats (left) (Rankin 2001). 
Interestingly, when assessing political ideology as opposed to partisanship, different 
results arise. For example, Rankin and Steve and Slaughter find that those who label 
themselves as conservative have a more protectionist outlook (Rankin 2001; Steve and 
Slaughter 2001).  
On first glance, findings regarding partisanship and political ideology appear 
quite contradictory and inconclusive. This is due to the fact that globalization can be 
opposed from both the political left and the right but for different reasons. The political 
right opposes globalization in defense of national sovereignty, while the political left 
opposes it on its perceived neo-liberal character. What is clear, however, is that both 
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partisanship and political ideology play a marginal role in predicting opinion of 
globalization but could, nonetheless, be useful control variables. 
Economic conditions are also determinants of opinion of economic integration. 
Edwards finds that individuals who feel that the economy will worsen within the next 
year are more likely to have a negative opinion of cultural, technological and economic 
globalization (Edwards 2006). Research further suggests that individuals’ assessment of 
the economy as a whole might be a stronger predictor of opinion of globalization than 
one’s personal economic assessment. For example, Rankin finds that individuals’ 
personal economic evaluation did not predict opinion of trade integration (Rankin 2001).  
More pertinent to the current study, there have been attempts to explore the 
relationship between national attachment and opinion of globalization. These studies 
show that individuals with higher levels of national attachment are more likely to be in 
favor of trade protectionism and against globalization. As Rankin, suggests, “National 
identity has the added significance of cutting across multiple cleavages in which patterns 
of trade liberalization evoke symbolic predispositions” (Rankin 2001:370). Rankin finds 
that individuals who tend to express rigid loyalty to the nation and tend to have restrictive 
conceptions of culture and sovereignty are opposed to trade integration and NAFTA 
(Rankin 2001). O’Rourke and Sinnott’s findings are similar. They find that nationalism, 
patriotism and chauvinism are strongly associated with protectionist attitudes (O’Rourke 
and Sinnott 2001). Mayda and Rodrik also find that nationalism and rigid conceptions of 
patriotism are strongly associated with trade protectionism (Mayda and Rodrik 2005).  
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These findings are very much in accord with the theoretical framework that is 
presented in Chapter 3. Globalization has had the effect of compromising the sovereignty 
of nation-states (Habermas 1998a; Habermas 1998b; Falk 1999; Giddens 2000; Sassen 
2006). This, in turn, generates nationalistic reactions wherein the nation-state, its 
structures and its symbols are posited in opposition to globalization or any form of 
international integration and ultimately rejected (Falk 1999; Rankin 2001; De Vries and 
Edwards 2009). As Rankin asserts, “Sovereign conceptions indicate how much value 
citizens attach to restricting external influence on domestic autonomy, including 
territorial space, cultural expression, economic and political control” (Rankin 2001: 361). 
When exploring the determinants of opinion of EU integration, several factors are 
at play. Hooghe and Marks, for example, find that collective and personal economic 
expectations are both positively correlated with EU integration favorability (Hooghe and 
Marks 2005). In their words, “The presumption is that citizens evaluate the economic 
consequences of European integration for themselves and for the groups of which they 
are part, and that such consequences motivate their attitudes” (Hooghe and Marks 
2005:420). Gabel and Whitten’s findings are similar but suggest that assessments of the 
economy as a whole, as opposed to one’s personal economic expectations, are greater 
predictors of individuals’ opinion of EU integration (Gabel and Whitten 1997). The 
salience of economic conditions in predicting people’s opinion in regards to EU 
integration is not surprising. As is explored in Chapter 3, the EU is a project initiated on 
economic incentives and considerations. It attempts to integrate nation-states 
economically by providing a supranational social and political platform for integration. 
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Nonetheless, perceptively, what is most salient about the EU is its economic character 
and its success in granting economic benefits in the context of managed and steered 
integration.  
In exploring the interplay between skill level and income, Gabel finds that, as 
manual workers’ income increases, their support for EU integration decreases (Gabel 
1998). The opposite holds true for professional workers (Gabel 1998). In assessing how 
values affect opinion of EU integration, De Vries and Edwards find that European 
integration is opposed by both the political right in defense of national sovereignty, and 
the political left based on the perception that the EU possesses a neo-liberal agenda (De 
Vries and Edwards 2009). In regards to nationalism, Hooghe and Marks find that 
individuals who hold exclusive conceptions of national identity oppose EU integration 
(Hooghe and Marks 2005). Moreover, these individuals are more likely to oppose EU 
integration when their country’s political elites are divided over the issue. 
Assessing peoples’ opinions of globalization is very important, particularly due to 
the fact that this phenomenon is not just a mental reality, but an existential socio-
economic milieu; and when a phenomenon affects every individual’s consciousness, it 
deserves our attention. For the purposes of this study, what will be explored is the 
interplay between opinion of globalization and national attachment, specifically within 
the EU, conceptualized as a conscious response to the phenomenon of globalization.  
It is important to comprehend the pervasive historical significance of nationalism 
in Europe, particularly in light of its post-WWII evolution. Whereas modern day Europe 
can be characterized by peace, stability and, generally, solidarity between its member 
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states, this was not always the case. As previously mentioned, historically, up until the 
mid-1940s, Europe had always been entrenched in warfare. The epitome of this is, 
obviously, the two world wars: World War I, which resulted in the death of 20 million 
people, and World War II, which resulted in the unprecedented death of 60 million 
people. Europe’s bloody history, especially during the 20
th
 century, can be, among other 
factors, attributed to its peoples’ embrace of nationalism and the myth of ethnic 
superiority, as well as citizens’ placement of absolute trust in their respective states, 
national leaders and national institutions (Dogan 1994; Goff et al. 1998). 
In this context, one can observe how globalization presents opportunities, as well 
as challenges for nation-states (Falk 1999; Giddens 2000; Sassen 2006). Globalization 
has facilitated conditions of economic and political turmoil between nation-states, an 
example being the world economic collapse of the 1930s which paved the way and the 
conditions for WWII (Goff et al. 1998). However, globalization has also facilitated 
conditions of international cooperation as is the case with the UN, NAFTA, OPEC, and 
supranational cooperation, as is the case with the EU.  
While the literature has addressed the subject matter of globalization quite 
thoroughly, particularly in assessing its effects and outcomes, a question that has only 
been marginally addressed is under what conditions can globalization function in a way 
which elicits supranational cooperation (as opposed to competition) and conditions of 
post-national economic, social and political solidarity. Since the EU can be considered, 
partly, a conscious, institutional and systemic response to globalization, it is prudent to 
examine it. The proposed study is unique in that it examines EU citizens’ opinions of 
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globalization within the only economic and sociopolitical system wherein national 
sovereignty is compromised but also shared. In conducting the study one can address 
more provocative questions:  
• How does living in a system of shared sovereignty impact individuals’ view of 
globalization?  
• Is national attachment posited in opposition to globalization in a system wherein 
national sovereignty is shared? 
 How is the interplay between national attachment and globalization configured in an 
economic socio-political system consciously constructed to manage the phenomenon of 
globalization? 
Europe presents a great opportunity when addressing these broader questions 
particularly because it is the birthplace of nationalism and because its history has been 
defined by the phenomenon. What proceeds is a theoretical exploration of the interplay 
between globalization, nationalism and the EU, which serves as the framework for the 
present study. 
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CHAPTER 3: Theoretical Framework 
 
Globalization and ational Sovereignty 
The present study examines whether trust placed in national institutions correlates 
with EU citizens’ opinion of globalization. A salient theme in the literature is that the 
forces of globalization, as a post-modern phenomenon, are simultaneously in unity and 
tension with the more traditional structures of the nation-state (Habermas 1998a; 
Habermas 1998b; Falk 1999; Giddens 2000; Sassen 2006). The former stems from the 
fact that the phenomenon of globalization presupposes, at the very least, an economic 
consensus between nation-states on a global scale. The latter stems from the fact that the 
forces of globalization compromise the sovereignty of nation-states. The nation-state’s 
dependency on the global economic system is a structural necessity that facilitates its 
survival. In other words, in order for the nation-state to survive in an era of post-border 
technological and economic interdependency and interconnectivity, it must succumb to 
the forces of globalization (Habermas 1998). 
Globalization has had the effect of weakening the sovereignty of nation-states as 
national governments are increasingly unable to protect themselves from the social, 
economic and political side-effects of the global economy (Sassen 2006). More 
specifically, the vulnerability of nation-states can be attributed to the fact that the global 
economic system has weakened the state-apparatus. In an attempt to harmonize their 
country’s economy with the neo-liberal norms of the global economic system, nation-
states have tended to under-utilize the state apparatus in regards to social and economic 
sustainability. As Habermas points out, the state apparatus’ “reduction has resulted from 
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a supply-wide economic policy that seeks to deregulate markets, reduce subsidies and 
improve investment conditions” (Habermas 1998a:1). 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, neo-liberalism, in recent years, has emerged as the 
dominant global economic ideology and seeks to deregulate markets by limiting 
government intervention in the economy. Neo-liberal advocates have been highly 
successful in their endeavors to open up and deregulate economies around the globe. 
These consist of politicians, economic elites and corporations seeking economic benefit. 
Their attempts to liberalize markets have been highly successful due to their 
advantageous social and economic status and power that enable them to utilize the 
nation-state in their favor. Their success in doing so has paved the way for the emergence 
of a highly interconnected, global economic system which nation-states have been 
compelled to accommodate and on which nation-state are, in turn, highly reliant.  
As a result, governments either willingly (as is generally the case with developed 
countries) or through economic coercion, adhered to neo-liberal economic practices even 
though their implementation may yield only marginal benefits and in many cases even 
cause further economic problems. The alternative option of implementing economic 
protectionist policies is no longer viable, as it inevitably forces nation-states’ economies 
into a degenerative state, unable to provide to its citizens the diverse array of necessary 
products and services that are available through the global economic system (Habermas 
1998a). Case in point: in the midst of increased poverty and social disorder, caused in 
part by neo-liberal economic practices, Third World countries are generally welcoming to 
multinational corporations, due to the fact that they offer employment to their citizens. A 
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study by Kohut and Wike, found that Ghanaians, Senegalese, Nigerians and other 
individuals from Africa, the world’s poorest continent, are especially welcoming to 
multinational corporations (Kohut and Wike 2008). What is significant about these 
findings is that global economic liberalism generates conditions under which nation-
states and individuals have no choice but to participate in the global economic system.  
Economic isolationism, in an era of rapidly expanding economic 
interconnectedness, characterized by an already existing post-colonial system of 
international specialization and division of labor, limits opportunity for economic 
expansion and fosters economic stagnation. Global economic outreach, on the other hand, 
allows access to a wider array of economic systems and markets and the opportunity for 
international exchange and investment. As McMichael points out, “economic nationalism 
came to be viewed as limiting development because it obstructed the transnational 
mobility of goods, money, and firms in the service of efficient allocation of global 
resources” (McMichael 2004:152). This becomes increasingly clear when assessing 
nation-states that have been thoroughly marginalized from the international community. 
For example, North Korea, a state excluded from the global economic system, faces 
tremendous challenges in sustaining its economy.  
The power of the global economic system is thusly derived from its capacity to 
essentially coerce nation-states to open up their economies. The nation-state is therefore 
compelled to compromise its sovereignty in a two-fold manner. It is forced to participate 
in an economic system which extends beyond its borders and, in doing so, loses a 
measure of control of its economic system. 
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Globalization has also had the effect of compromising the sovereignty of the 
nation-state in various other fashions. It has, for one, redefined the symbolic and 
experiential meaning of citizenship (Falk 1999; Sassen 2006). Traditionally, the notion of 
citizenship was intrinsically tied to the nation-state. This relationship was re-enforced in 
the institutionalization of the citizen-national through education, warfare and cultural 
institutions (Sassen 2006). As a consequence, the citizen pledged exclusive allegiance to 
the nation-state as the basis for his or her nationality. In return, the nation-state, much like 
an exaggerated parent figure, became the guarantor of survival, order, development, 
security and social stability. As Sassen points out, the “state came to be seen as a key to 
ensuring the well-being of significant portions of both the working class and the 
bourgeoisie” (Sassen 2006:284). In this sense, the symbolic significance of the citizen 
was conflated with that of the nation-state.  
However, national governments are more and more straying away from their role 
as providers and local development managers, as they shift their focus on managing their 
countries’ role in the international economic system (McMichael 2004). Practices such as 
outsourcing, reduced welfare and policies which allow for the loss of unionized jobs, 
greatly contribute to the waning meaning of citizenship as states provide less and less to 
their citizens and individuals are increasingly pressured to rely on themselves for their 
well-being and social security. 
But the fact of the matter is that a compromised state-apparatus undermines the 
very conditions it was designed to provide – guaranteeing economic freedom on the one 
hand and social, political security and freedom on the other, essentially harmonizing free 
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market capitalism with liberal democracy. As Habermas points out “Social costs are 
rising to levels that might exceed the integration capacity of liberal societies. Growing 
poverty and social insecurity have emerged as a corollary of growing income disparities, 
and social disintegration has followed” (Habermas 1998a:1). This holds true, in varying 
degrees, in both the wealthier Western and the poorer Third World nations. In this sense, 
globalization has redefined the state-apparatus, and consequently the nation-state, both 
structurally and symbolically as it is more and more experienced as a relative entity in the 
midst of a multitude of global forces.  
The structural realities of globalization come in direct conflict with the 
nationalistic world view – a perspective which cannot accept the notion that the superior 
nation-state and especially its sovereignty can be subject to external forces. National 
sovereignty can be defined as the perceived supreme and absolute authority of the nation-
state, embodied by its independence, to manage, regulate and define all its affairs and 
aspects which are either tangibly contained within its visible borders or that are 
intrinsically or extrinsically related to its invisible mental reach (Krasner 2001; Rankin 
2001).  
This rigid conception of national sovereignty is historically associated with 
nationalism’s absolutization of the nation-state. Nationalism can be defined as “the 
unprecedented moral absolutization of the nation, its freedom, its interest, its community, 
its identity, and its power, in combination with the derivative presumption that its 
supreme moral status furnishes thereby ‘the right’ to employ all means, including 
adversarial and lethal means, in the nation’s defense, sustenance, advancement, 
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expanding powers, and alleged ‘destined’ historical realization” (Anastasiou 2008b:32). 
Thus, the derivative belief is that the nation-state has the inherent power and right to 
define all its associations. It, therefore, cannot be subjected to or controlled by any 
external forces.  
This particular outlook is further reinforced by the fact that the collective 
consciousness of modern, post-industrial societies has been, to a large extent, shaped by 
the interaction and confluence of an imagined national community with an all 
encompassing state-apparatus (Anderson 1983). The experience of the individual and the 
collective are intrinsically tied to the nation-state. A compromised nation-state is 
therefore experienced and perceived as a compromised self and a compromised social 
community. It is for this reason that individuals who have rigid nationalistic conceptions 
of national identity and express rigid emotional connections to the nation-state are 
particularly skeptical and resentful of any sort of external forces that might have an 
impact on the nation-state but which have not been defined and determined by it 
(O’Rourke and Sinnott 2001; Rankin 2001; Hooghe and Mark 2005; Mayda and Rodrik 
2005).  
These external forces are particularly salient on the economic level as nation-
states are increasingly constrained by systemic global economic interdependencies which, 
in turn, compromise their political, cultural, social and economic volition and agency 
(Habermas 1998a).  It is through this framework that the current study looks at the 
relationship between trust placed in national institutions and opinion of globalization 
within the EU. 
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ational Institutions 
National institutions are selected as a key element for analysis because they are 
the public institutions of a nation-state that facilitate and assist in the implementation of 
its structural social, political, economic, legal and bureaucratic processes. The systemic 
convergences of these institutions generate the state-apparatus, the legitimate 
representative and manifestation of the nation.  
What is clearly evident in the literature is that the forces of globalization operate, 
at least in part, in opposition to the nation-state. This holds true both when assessing 
theoretical academic work and large scale public opinion polls (Habermas 1998a; 
Habermas 1998b; Falk 1999; Giddens 2000; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2001; Rankin 2001; 
Hooghe and Mark 2005; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Sassen 2006). What transpires in 
Chapter 2, in assessing determinants of opinion of globalization, is that individuals who 
tend to be nationalistic or have stronger emotional ties to the nation-state tend to be 
against globalization and trade integration. 
The current study builds on the literature by assessing levels of trust in national-
institutions in relation to opinion of globalization. This particular focus can be considered 
a natural evolution of the literature as the focus is shifted away from nationalism as a 
value or outlook. Instead, national institutions, being the legitimate representation and 
manifestation of the nation on the structural social, political, economic, legal and 
bureaucratic level, are considered. In this sense, the current study is bridging the world of 
values, i.e. nationalism and national attachment, to the structural and functional realities, 
i.e. national institutions. One expects that there exists an integrative dialectical 
relationship between the two, in that individuals who have higher levels of trust in their 
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national institutions have a more nationalistic world view that rejects any external forces 
that compromise the sovereignty or the symbolic conception of the nation-state and, 
therefore, have a negative opinion of globalization. The present study explores whether 
this relationship exists within the EU. 
 
The European Union 
 The EU is a political, economic and social union comprised of 27 member states 
(Europa 2009). Since its establishment, the EU has striven for cooperation and solidarity 
to prevent poverty and inter-national conflict and to promote unity and fraternity among 
its member states (Habermas 2002; Anastasiou 2008a; Europa 2009). These principles 
are premised on the rule of law, security and justice, peace and stability, diversity and 
economic and social solidarity (Europa 2009). From an economic standpoint, the EU is a 
single market trading bloc which guarantees free trade between its member states through 
the elimination of protectionist barriers, such as tariffs and quotas (McCormick 2005; 
Wood and Yesilada 2006). From a social standpoint, the EU guarantees free mobility 
(travel and migration) and free movement of human labor between its member states 
(McCormick 2005; Wood and Yesilada 2006). 
 The structure of the EU is unique in that the economic and sociopolitical 
processes of its member states also take place beyond the boundaries of the nation-state 
through regional democratic institutions that member states jointly manage. This poses a 
challenge as well as an opportunity for globalization research where the relationship of 
the self-contained nation-state and the invasive forces of globalization are conventionally 
assessed in opposition to one another. The EU, among other things, is a unique response 
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to the phenomenon of globalization (Habermas 1998b; Leonard 2006). It attempts to 
manage the pervasive effects of globalization in a highly structured and regulated social, 
political and economic system. This process is elaborated in the re-configuration of 
democracy through, but also beyond, the nation-state. As Lagos points out, “in the 
formation of the predecessors to the European Union, we see a desire to diminish the 
solitude of individual countries in Europe in order to increase their collective strength” 
(Lagos 2003:336). More specifically, this process is premised on the principle of shared 
sovereignty (Giddens 2000; Anastasiou 2008a). Practically, this entails the 
implementation of various structural social, political, economic, legal and bureaucratic 
processes beyond the national state apparatus. These processes take place both on an 
intergovernmental and supranational level through transnational democratic decision-
making. As Hooghe and Marks point out,  
 
“The European union meshes national and European governments in a system of multi-
level governance that pools sovereignty over important aspect of citizens’ lives. To the 
extent that European integration makes it more difficult for national governments to 
pursue distinctly national preferences, it undermines national self-determination and blurs 
boundaries between distinct national communities” (Hooghe and Marks 2005:423).  
 
 This convergence of highly integrated and inter-country administrative, 
commercial and regulatory processes, function to mitigate possible threats of 
globalization and nationalism (Lagos 2003; Anastasiou 2008a). Lagos calls this process 
“steered democratic globalization” (Lagos 2003:336). 
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It becomes clear that EU citizens are considerably unique and different from 
citizens of conventional systems of socio-economic governance, where sovereignty and 
power is principally and solely lodged in the nation-state. In the interest of the study, it is 
prudent to assess how EU citizens might be unique in the way they experience the 
phenomenon of globalization. Citizens living in a sociopolitical structure delineated by 
the boundaries of the nation-state, experience globalization as an external force. EU 
citizens, on the other hand, in light of the fact that they are part of a system of shared 
sovereignty, might have a bifurcated experience of globalization, where it is seen as an 
internal force which is integral to their system of social organization – the EU – but also 
as an external force to their respective nation-states.  
Furthermore, EU citizens experience the phenomenon of globalization, not solely 
through their nation-state, but also through the EU. When countries join the EU, they 
experience an intensification of the phenomenon of globalization. This is due not only to 
the fact that they are required to adopt non-protectionist and open-border policies toward 
countries within the EU, but also to the fact that they are required to adopt similar 
policies toward the broader international community (McCormick 2005). From a cultural 
standpoint, this results in emigration to and immigration from other EU countries, such as 
Poland and The Czech Republic. From an economic standpoint, it leads to a huge influx 
of foreign investment money and also the opportunity for investment in other EU 
countries and the broader international community.   
Moreover, the EU grants its citizens higher levels of agency. This is manifested in 
the EU’s focus on citizens’ rights and democracy wherein supranational rights and 
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freedoms are granted to its citizens, such as the right to travel and work freely in any EU 
country (Giddens 2000; McCormick 2005). This might have a considerable effect on the 
way individuals experience globalization given that they may feel empowered in the face 
of its invasive potential. For example, in the EU, a single citizen has the right to take any 
government or private business within the EU to court on the basis of EU law violation.  
EU citizens are also unique in the way they experience national attachment. 
Europe has seen a trend in recent years in decreasing levels of nationalism, often 
attributed to the EU’s unique structural configuration based on shared sovereignty. As 
Hooghe and Marks point out, the EU “provokes a sharp sense of identity loss among 
defenders of the nation (national attachment) and among anti-cosmopolitans 
(multiculturalism)” (Hooghe and Marks 2005:423). Empirical evidence confirms this.  
In a study of European nationalism, Mattei Dogan finds that nationalism levels in 
Europe have, in general, decreased (Dogan 1994). For example, in 1981, fewer Germans, 
French, Italians, Belgians and Dutch were “very proud” of their nationality, compared to 
1970. On the other hand, Greece, Spain and Ireland showed sustained levels of national 
pride between 1981 and 1991which Dogan attributes to recent turbulent national events 
that were still salient in the collective memory (Dogan 1994).   
There is also a trend in decreasing levels of confidence in the national army 
(Dogan 1994). For example, between 1981 and 1991, the average number of individuals 
in the European Community who had “great deal of confidence in their army” decreased 
from 20% to 13%. Moreover, the majority of many European countries, such as the 
Netherlands, Denmark and Belgium, do not display confidence in their armies. When 
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Germans were polled in 1990, they ranked the army last as a national investment priority 
and preferred expenditure in health, housing and schools. Interestingly, a 1990 poll 
showed that two thirds of the French were in favor of a common European defense. As 
Dogan suggests, “one of the traditional components of nationalism – the capacity of 
military defense of individual countries – seems to be fading” (Dogan 1994:40). The 
exceptions are Britain and Finland, both of which display high levels of confidence in 
their army. 
 As confidence in the army wanes, so does the will to fight for one’s country 
(Dogan 1994). In 1981, only 43% of those polled in nine European countries were willing 
to fight for their country while 40% were not. For example, only 35% of Germans, 31% 
of Italians and 27% Belgians were willing to fight for their country. It becomes clear, that 
the socio-political climate of present-day Europe stands in sharp contrast to that prior to 
World War II.  
 Trustworthiness between Western European nations is also on the rise (Dogan 
1994). The absolute majority of all Europeans polled in 1980 expressed trust in nine out 
of thirteen European countries considered. Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal were the 
only ones not perceived as trustworthy by the majority of other Europeans. However, 
between 1976 and 1990 levels of mutual trust increased for almost all countries, 
including trust toward Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy. Britain was the only exception, 
whose level of trust toward other European countries did not improve. Similarly, there 
was a decrease in trust toward the British by other Europeans. Most notably, Dogan finds 
that the majority of both the Germans and the French expressed high levels of trust in 
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each other (Dogan 1994). The French perceived the Germans as being the most 
trustworthy nation and vice versa. This stands in sharp contrast to the past, when the 
French and the Germans, in vehemently hating one another, attempted to reduce each 
other to rubble in the context of two world wars. As Dogan asserts, “World wars belong 
to history, European unification represents the future.” (Dogan 1994:45). 
 As levels of mutual trust in European countries increase so does the collective 
European consciousness (Dogan 1994). Polls show that there is a rise in positive attitudes 
toward European unification in all countries within the EU. Supranationalism is on the 
rise as nationalistic trends decrease in a framework of economic, social, cultural and 
political solidarity (Dogan 1994). Moreover, there is the realization that economic 
nationalism is a thing of the past. As Dogan suggests, “This interdependency engenders a 
supranational market, detrimental to old-fashioned economic isolationism and 
protectionism” (Dogan 1994:49). As markets and borders open up, people, ideas and 
goods are circulated and exchanged freely. Additionally, it is interesting to note that more 
Europeans have crossed borders within Europe in the decades since World War II than in 
the previous eight centuries. 
 In light of the above, the EU can be conceived as a transnational economic socio-
political entity, consciously designed to manage the phenomenon of globalization and its 
potential volatile nature. This occurs in an interactive and dialectic fashion, wherein, in 
the context of globalization, economic stability and benefit are bolstered and reinforced 
strategically by the promotion of supranationalism, transnational democracy and shared 
national sovereignty. On the individual level, what drives peoples’ support of the EU is 
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economic benefit. The salience of economics within the context of the EU is reflected in 
the fact that, when EU citizens are asked to consider what the EU means to them 
personally, choosing among a list of items, the second most popular response (chosen by 
50% of the respondents) is the Euro (Eurobarometer 2004). The prominence of 
economics within the EU context is also observed historically. The EU has always 
emphasized economic sustainability as a deterrent of social unrest. For example, the EU’s 
Common Agricultural Policy, which aims to ensure reasonable food prices for its citizens 
and fair incomes for farmers, comprises 45% of the EU budget (Europa 2009).  
What is important to note, in regards to such programs and policies, is that within 
the EU, economic liberalism is enacted so long as its potential economic and, as a 
consequence, social and political vices are curtailed. For example, the EU’s Structural 
and Cohesion funds, which comprise 35% of its budget, aim to reduce economic 
inequalities between member states. These funds are mainly contributed by the EU’s 
richest member states and are then diverted to countries and areas of low economic 
standing to promote development and job creation. In practice, this reduces income gaps 
between countries and regions, the result of which is greater common economic benefit.  
But what enables the success of the EU’s economic policies is the fact that they 
are also reinforced by political integration which has the effect of further empowering the 
bloc. Transnational cooperation on the political level is essential to this process. But 
cooperation within the EU also means giving up national powers and compromising 
national sovereignty. This is observed on multiple levels. It is, for one, observed in the 
willingness of member states to give up a portion of their economic national sovereignty, 
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in contributing to a common fund aimed for development in economically disadvantaged 
areas. It is also observed in areas where EU law supersedes national law. In the case of 
the environment, EU member states are forced to adhere to the EU’s environmental 
standards, due to the fact that common environmental standards ensure fairer business 
practices between member states. 
These processes of economic and political integration are further reinforced by 
cultural and social integration, which, even though is implicit in the context of salient 
economics and politics, is nonetheless paramount to integration. Present day EU can be 
characterized by immense waves of transnational migration and travel as well as 
transnational work and educational opportunities. On the social level, this not only 
contributes to the intensification of interactions between people of different ethnicities, 
but it also contributes to the creation of an integrated European cultural identity. It is by 
no surprise that when EU citizens are asked to consider what the EU means to them 
personally, the most popular response (chosen by 50.2% of the respondents) is freedom 
to work, study and become educated in the EU (Eurobarometer 2004). 
Implicitly, this rise of European consciousness reinforces the economic and 
political structures on which the EU is built. It is for this reason that in his speech of May 
28
th
 2001, then French prime-minister Lionel Jospin called for greater supranational 
social integration, based on a European way of life. In his words,  
 
“Until very recently, the efforts of the Union focused on the creation of monetary 
and economic union[…] Today, we need a wider perspective going beyond this, 
 
67 
 
otherwise Europe will become simply just another market which will disintegrate under 
the effects of globalization. After all, Europe is much more than a market. It symbolizes a 
social model whose growth has historical dimensions” (European Navigator 2010) 
 But perhaps, one of the greatest contributions of EU social integration, as 
facilitated by its economic and political success, is curtailing nationalism. What proceeds 
is a comprehensive analysis of the contributing factors to decreasing levels of nationalism 
within the EU. 
 
Reasons for Decreasing Levels of ationalism 
 Europe’s decreasing levels of nationalism, among other things, can be attributed 
to the EU’s system of shared national sovereignty. European nation-states are generally 
small or mid-sized countries that have proven to have greater political, cultural, scientific 
and economic potential in unity (Dogan 1994). As European integration moves forward, 
so does each country’s capacity and potential for progress. Economic progress, in 
particular, has shown to be negatively correlated with levels of nationalism (Dogan 
1994). The EU has enabled greater economic growth for its member states by creating a 
large transnational economic market and by sustaining peace. Creating a peaceful 
political environment not only allows for free travel, trade and cooperation but also 
allows for decreased military spending and allocation of national budgets toward social 
and economic sustainability. Furthermore, the EU, by its emphasis on the rule of law, 
human rights and democracy, has allowed for the emergence of a new European civic 
culture wherein basic values, perspectives and social experiences are congruent between 
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nations. As Dogan suggests, “the differences within nations are greater than differences 
between countries” (Dogan 1994:59).  
This socio-cultural climate is accompanied by an emergence of a supranational 
consciousness – that of the European citizen – that complements and integrates national 
consciousness in a manner that is unprecedented. This can be considered a derivative of 
the EU’s harmonization process, in which laws, economic, political and social practices 
are standardized between countries (Dogan 1994). While this transfer of power from the 
national to the supranational level is rarely pronounced, it has shown to be consistently 
effective in sustaining supranational integration and in nourishing supranational identities 
(Dogan 1994). Dogan, in agreement with the theoretical framework put forth in the 
present paper, further suggests that “The sovereignty of the nation-state is slowly but 
progressively reduced by a kind of loose confederal sovereignty, called vaguely 
‘Community’” (Dogan 1994:60). 
 To some, the EU might appear as a fascinating, intriguing and unique 
phenomenon. But there are also those, particularly in the public political sphere and the 
mainstream media, who consistently fail to recognize the EU’s contribution to its 
European countries – the sustenance of peace and socio-economic stability in the 
aftermath of two world wars. For example, in a 2006 Newsweek article, journalist Fareed 
Zakaria, prophesized the decline of Europe. The article describes the author’s perspective 
of how the EU, through its socio-political and economic functions and structures, is 
debilitating itself.  
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Specifically, Zakaria takes aim at the EU’s economic regulations, what he 
perceives as its inability to reform and, most notably, its dwindling military spending. In 
his words, “Its dwindling defense [the EU’s] spending weakens its ability to be a military 
partner of the U.S., or to project military power abroad even for peacekeeping purposes” 
(Zakaria 2006:45).  
Pat Buchanan, American conservative political commentator, syndicate columnist 
and broadcaster and presidential hopeful, also took aim at the EU recently. His basic 
premise is that the EU is an eroding system due to its incapacity to elicit love and loyalty 
from its constituents because, as he puts it, “The EU is a thing of paper, an intellectual 
construct. Unlike a nation, it has no heart and no soul” (Merino 2008:46). Most notable, 
is Buchanan’s analysis of Europe’s recent peaceful history. As he suggests,  
 
“it was not the EU that [kept] Europe secure and at peace. America kept the Red Army 
from the Elbe and the Rhine [rivers bordering Germany]. America saved Western Europe 
from the fate of the Hungarians in 1956, the Czechs in 1968 and the Poles in 1981. 
America pulled the British and French chestnuts out of the Balkan fires of the 1990s” 
(Merino 2008:43)  
 
He then continues, by stating that “German-French amity is a product of 
statesmanship, but also of the defeat of France in 1940 and the reduction of Germany to 
rubble by the American, British and Soviet armies in 1944-1945” (Merino 2008:44). The 
claim that Europe is a peaceful continent because of the U.S.’s military might and that the 
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relationship of France and Germany is one of unity because they reduced each other to 
rubble is academically unsound, to say the least. 
These perceptions typically stem from uninformed views of the EU and its 
history. The fact of the matter is that present-day Europe can only make sense when 
assessed against its historical backdrop of nationalism, particularly prevalent in the first 
half of the 20
th
 century, the socio-political outcome of which were two world wars, 60 
million casualties and the destruction of a whole continent. It is through these realities 
that the EU has emerged, coupled with the explicit realization that war was not the 
answer in dealing with the pervasive effects of a globalized political, social and economic 
reality. 
 Zakaria and Buchanan both fail to comprehend the fact that present day Europe is 
a united and peaceful continent, partly because it has shifted its attention away from 
defense spending and display of military might, actualized through mutual, inter-
governmental arms reduction agreements. Rather, supranational cooperation is in order, 
configured in a system of social, political and economic integration and through shared 
national sovereignty, which has had the consequent effect of mitigating nationalism and 
the negative effects of globalization. Zakaria fails to grasp this too, when he criticizes 
Europe’s leaders for “backtracking on their proposals and instead mouthing pious 
rhetoric about the need to ‘manage’ globalization” (Zakaria 2006:45).  
Moreover, a frequent mistake that (particularly U.S.) public figures make, is to 
talk about the EU as if it is a country, in the likes of a federation, such as the U.S.. 
Granted it would be easy to criticize the EU if it actually were a country, due to its lack of 
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power and executive mechanisms to fully implement laws and regulations – powers that 
national governments hold comprehensively. However, in realizing that the EU is 
actually a group of individual countries that come together in a system of shared political, 
social, economic and national sovereignty, one understands both its exceptionality and its 
success in overcoming the traditional nationalistic barriers that have kept nations and 
people apart, divided and, at times, in conflict for the past two centuries. Nonetheless, 
challenges still remain. 
 
The End of ationalism? 
While Europe has seen a decline in nationalism since the end of the Second World 
War and the establishment of the EU, nationalist tendencies still remain and are, at times, 
considerably pronounced. The truth is that despite an emergent European culture and a 
blossoming European consciousness, national identities are predominantly the most 
salient (Hooghe and Marks 2005). 
 Globalization, as an external force, has had the effect of rejuvenating nationalist 
tendencies in the European public. As stated earlier, this can be attributed mainly to the 
fact that globalization compromises the sovereignty of nation-states and has redefined the 
symbolic and experiential meaning of citizenship. In the wake of exacerbated economic 
liberalism, citizens find themselves confronted with the reality that their country has to 
succumb to external forces in order to survive in the context of the global economic 
system. Moreover, the changes brought forth by globalization are rapid and exponential, 
creating a sense of uncertainty and uneasiness in the European public. For this reason, the 
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issue of globalization has been most prevalent in the framework of EU politics (Feron 
2004).  
But often, in the context of constant change and compromised national 
sovereignty, citizen nationals revert to nationalist ideals in an attempt to compensate for 
the uncertainties of globalization. As Rankin points out, “national identity, however, may 
be evoked and even reinforced by political debate concerning the relationship between 
trade liberalization, national sovereignty and cultural integrity” (Rankin 2001:353). 
Citizen nationals, therefore, experience the EU in a bifurcated manner. On the one hand, 
they experience the EU as an effective steering force in the wake of a highly 
interconnected world, assuaging and guarding against the extreme potential realities of 
globalization. On the other, they experience the EU as the vehicle through which they 
experience globalization. For this reason, globalization and its negative effects are often 
perceived as EU derivatives. As an outcome, strong reservations still remain about the 
EU.  
Moreover, as nationalist tendencies and protectionism increase, so does suspicion 
toward the EU. Similar to globalization, the EU is, at times, perceived as an external 
force compromising the sovereignty of nation-states. As Hooghe and Marks point out, 
“opposition to European integration is couched as defense of the nation against control 
from Brussels.” (Hooghe and Marks 2005:423). The outcome is mistrust and a reified 
sense of national identity functioning as a collective mental barrier toward European 
integration. It is for this reason that Hooghe and Marks assert that “the strongest 
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territorial identities are national, and we suspect that such identities constrain preferences 
concerning European integration” (Hooghe and Marks 2005:423). 
 The radical right has made effective use of such relapses in nationalism to 
reinforce and broaden its base. Political parties of the extreme- right have made 
considerable political gains in recent years in countries such as France, Denmark, Italy, 
Belgium and Austria (Hooghe and Marks 2005). Their success can be partly attributed to 
their rejection of European integration. Their ideological stance is premised on the 
principle that the EU is compromising the sovereignty of their respective nation-states. 
This outlook is particularly salient among individuals who identify strongly with their 
national community and who are “attached to its exclusionary norms” (Kriesi and Lachat 
2004:4). In other words, Euro-skepticism is more salient among individuals with 
nationalistic tendencies. In fact, research suggests that national attachment has shown to 
be one of the strongest predictors of both European integration and opinion of 
globalization (O’Rourke and Sinnott 2001; Rankin 2001; Hooghe and Marks 2005; 
Mayda and Rodrik 2005). Due to its existential socio-historic significance, nationalism, 
particularly in times of uncertainty or confusion, can be retrieved in order to sustain a 
sense of normative collective social coherence.  
While the radical right in Europe is still somewhat of a marginal movement, they 
have, nonetheless, demonstrated that they are a “decisive force in swaying popular 
opinion against Europe by mobilizing the growing uncertainties about the future of 
European integration among the mass public” (De Vries and Edwards 2009:6). What can 
be deduced is that nationalism does not only exist in the fringes and marginal movements 
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of society. To this very day, it has proven to be a pervasive European phenomenon 
dictating attitudes and behaviors. 
Therefore, in considering the literature on nationalism which suggests that the 
stronger a citizen’s allegiance to the nation-state, the more likely he or she will be 
opposed to external forces that compromise the sovereignty of the nation-state, as is the 
case with globalization, the hypothesis is that EU citizens who place more trust in their 
national institutions will be more likely to have a negative opinion of globalization. 
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CHAPTER 4: Data and Methods 
 
Research Design 
The analysis is conducted using data collected by the European Commission in a 
Eurobarometer survey of EU citizens on various issues regarding the EU, globalization 
and national challenges. Beginning in 1973, the Eurobarometer survey is conducted in 
EU member states, typically 2 to 5 times a year. The survey contains standardized items, 
such as questions pertaining to citizens’ life satisfaction, but can also contain additional 
questions about various other issues, such as citizens’ attitudes toward nuclear safety. The 
European Commission conducts the Eurobarometer survey interviews to gauge public 
opinion on issues so as to inform public policy.  
The data on which the present study relies was collected in a 2004 Eurobarometer 
survey which was conducted in 15 EU member states (see Table 1). In selecting the 
respondents, multistage national probability sampling was conducted, yielding a total of 
16,216 cases and thereby ensuring adequate number of respondents from each of 15 
member states (see Table 1). Thus, demographic bias is reduced and the likelihood that 
the findings can be generalized is increased. The data were gathered using face-to-face 
survey interviews.  
Using the Eurobarometer survey data is suitable for the purposes of the current 
study for various reasons. For one, survey interviewing is a very appropriate 
methodological approach when assessing individuals’ opinions. This is consistently 
reflected in the literature (O’Rourke and Sinnott 2001; Rankin 2001; Scheve and 
Slaughter 2001; Lagos 2003; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Edwards 2006).  
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Moreover, a total of 16,216 cases ensures statistical power whereby more 
complex analyses can be conducted using a large number of variables. This imparts a 
great advantage, especially in considering that large, cross-national populations will be 
assessed. 
Additionally, the rigidity of survey questionnaires ensures reliability. The 
questionnaire was administered in a consistent manner and had exactly the same 
questions and response categories across interviews. Moreover, the questionnaire had 
been translated into each respective country’s native language. This ensures that survey 
questions were answered appropriately and reliably across countries and individuals. 
The dataset also contains a wide array of data to work with, ranging from 
demographics to opinions of globalization, the economy and the EU. This imparts more 
options and possibilities when analyzing data. Moreover, the dataset is rich in control 
variables that can be included in the analysis to counter spuriousness. 
By using the Eurobarometer dataset, which contains cross-national data, the 
research question can be addressed appropriately, which inquires about EU citizens as a 
whole but there is also the added advantage of observing country differences by 
controlling for country of citizenship. This ensures that the research question can be 
answered in a comprehensive and holistic manner and offer insight that is nuanced and 
complex. 
Lastly, in using survey data to conduct the analysis, the theoretical framework – 
the potential tension between national trust and the forces of globalization in the EU, an 
economic socio-political system of shared nation sovereignty consciously constructed as 
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a response to globalization – can be utilized and implemented appropriately, as the 
dataset contains adequate EU data on both national trust and opinion of globalization. 
Trust placed in national institutions is the main independent variable. It is 
operationalized using the following five indicators in the form of an index:  
1. Trust in the national parliament 
2. Trust in the national government 
3. Trust in the national legal system 
4. Trust in the army 
5. Trust in the police 
In conducting the questionnaire, the respondent was primed with the question of 
“I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. 
For each of the following institutions please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to 
trust it”, followed by a list of institutions. The above five institutions were the only 
national institutions listed. Their injunction provides a robust measurement for the more 
general concept of trust in national institutions as they represent the most salient 
symbolic, functional and experiential dimensions of the state apparatus.  
Each indicator was initially measured using three response categories: tend to 
trust, tend not trust and don’t know (coded 1,2,3 respectively). In constructing the index, 
all respondents that answered “don’t know” are coded as “missing”. The remaining 
categories are coded 0 (tend not to trust) and 1 (tend to trust). Preliminary ANOVA 
analyses and Tukey’s B tests indicate that the most appropriate cut-off point for this 
dichotomous variable is .5. Correlation analysis indicates high construct validity wherein 
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indicators are highly correlated and can therefore be used together to construct an index. 
A Cronbach’s alpha analysis yields a value of .776, indicating a strong relationship 
between indicators. The index includes respondents who answered at least 4 out of 5 
questions to ensure that the independent variable is measured comprehensively.  
Opinion of globalization is the dependent variable. It is operationalized in the 
form of an index using five questions from the Eurobarometer survey on respondents’ 
opinion of globalization in regards to issues of national sovereignty: 
1. “Overall, globalization is a good thing for (OUR COUNTRY)” 
This indicator measures the dependent variable in a general and straight-forward manner. 
The expectation is that respondents who experience or view the phenomenon of 
globalization as a force that compromises the sovereignty of their respective nation-states 
will have less of a tendency to regard globalization as a good thing for their country. 
 
2. “Globalization represents a threat to employment in (OUR COUNTRY)” 
This indicator measures opinion of globalization specifically in regards to globalization’s 
effects on national employment. National employment, as a subset of the global 
economic system, is subject to the dynamic, vigorous and, often, volatile economic 
conditions put forth by globalization (Castells 2006; Mills et al 2008). National 
employment can be threatened by globalization in various ways. A prominent theme in 
the literature is that globalization has had the effect of creating an interconnected 
international system of labor (Goff et al. 1998; McMichael 2004).This has engendered a 
global system of production wherein labor is fluid and mobile between countries (Mills et 
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al 2008). National employment, therefore, can be threatened in the form of immigrant 
workers willing to work for lower wages and outsourcing – subcontracting to third-
parties such as foreign governments, companies and labor – as companies export labor 
and production to other countries to minimize costs. Employment can also be threatened 
as a result of the state’s reduced capacity to protect workers’ rights as it is, essentially, 
coerced to lower its protection standards to become more competitive in the global 
economy (Mills et al 2008). Moreover, national employment is particularly vulnerable to 
the interconnectivity of the global economic system because economic recessions or 
depressions in other countries can adversely affect the local economy. This compromises 
the state-apparatus’ capacity to provide and sustain a stable system of employment. As a 
consequence, national economic sovereignty is compromised. The expectation is that 
respondents who experience globalization as a force that compromises national economic 
sovereignty in regards to employment will have more of a tendency to regard 
globalization as a threat to employment. 
 
3. “Globalization makes it more difficult to control the quality of food products sold in 
(OUR COUNTRY)” 
This indicator measures opinion of globalization specifically in regards to globalization’s 
effect on the quality control of food products. As international trade intensifies, more and 
more food products are imported. Complications arise when countries have incongruent 
sanitation and quality standards. These complications can certainly be countered through 
the implementation of post-import food inspections but that requires the implementation 
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of additional bureaucracies and expenses. The international World Trade Organization 
(WTO) Agreements, as finalized by the Uruguay talks of 1994, recognize that 
governments have the right to take post-import, pre-cautionary measures to ensure that 
adequate quality standards have been met. However, the WTO accords call that these 
measures only be implemented to the extent that they protect human, animal or plant life. 
So, in essence, quality control is ultimately the responsibility of the country where the 
food is produced. U.N. member-countries are merely encouraged, but not required, to 
adhere to international food quality standards (World Trade Organization 2010). Case in 
point is the recent investigations regarding Chinese food exports where a number of toxic 
substances were discovered in various food products, such as milk powder and fish 
(Weise and Schmit 2007; Euronews 2008). While investigations, bans and post-import 
regulations were implemented in response to China’s toxic food exports, they were done 
so only after several people suffered health problems. Such occurrences make it clear 
that, in a globalized economic system, the state-apparatus’ capacity to regulate the quality 
of food products in the interest of the well-being of its citizens is undermined. By 
implication, national sovereignty is compromised as the state is unable to fully control the 
quality of food products consumed within its national borders. The expectation is that 
citizen who regard globalization as an invasive force which compromises national 
sovereignty will be more likely to agree with the premise put forth by this survey 
question. 
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4. “Globalization represents a good opportunity for (NATIONALITY) companies” 
This indicator measures opinion of globalization in regards to the manner by which 
globalization affects national companies. A global economic system imparts the 
opportunity for cross-border economic exchange. This can take place either in the form of 
trade but also in the form of outsourcing. In the case of outsourcing, national companies 
are not held fully accountable to the laws, regulations and limitations of their respective 
nation-states. For example, a trend in today’s global economy is for corporations to set up 
offices or factories in so-called tax havens, so as to avoid paying taxes to their respective 
governments. The sovereignty of the nation-state is compromised due to its limited 
capacity in regulating its national companies and by implication its economic system. 
Moreover, as an outcome of the economic pressures of globalization, nation-states, in an 
attempt to enact what they perceive as effective liberal economic models, have been 
compelled to transfer many state-owned enterprises to the private sector (Mills et al 
2008). The sovereignty of the nation-state is compromised due to the fact that it has, 
essentially, been compelled or coerced into relinquishing control over certain of its 
institutions. The expectation is that individuals who tend to experience globalization as 
an invasive force which compromises national sovereignty will have less of a tendency to 
regard globalization as a good opportunity for their national companies. 
 
5. “Overall, globalization is a good thing for me” 
This indicator is the most nebulous and its inclusion was a subject matter of much 
deliberation and theoretical reflection. The conceptualization and experience of “the self” 
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in modern society is partly determined by conditions put forth by the nation-state (Mack 
1983). As previously stated, in modern societies one’s individual consciousness is 
ultimately tied to the collective consciousness, intrinsically tied to the normative order 
and actualized through the agent of the nation-state (Berger 1969; Smith 1993). 
Therefore, a compromised nation-state and its sovereignty ultimately affects the 
individual lived experienced. The expectation is that individuals who experience 
globalization as a threat to national sovereignty will have less of a tendency to regard 
globalization as being good for them personally. Possible exceptions to this are 
individuals who are conscious of their class, a phenomenon typically observed among 
those of higher socio-economic status. Individuals of higher socio-economic status might 
be conscious of the fact that globalization and economic liberalism benefits them and 
could thus have more of a tendency to have a positive opinion of globalization. 
Each indicator is initially measured using three response categories: tend to agree, 
tend to disagree and don’t know (coded 1,2,3 respectively). In constructing the index, all 
respondents that answered “don’t know” are coded as “missing”. The remaining 
categories are coded 0 (negative opinion) and 1 (positive opinion). Preliminary ANOVA 
analyses and Tukey’s B tests indicate that the most appropriate cut-off point for this 
dichotomous variable is .5. Correlation analysis indicates high construct validity wherein 
indicators are highly correlated and can therefore be used in conjunction to construct an 
index. A Cronbach’s alpha analysis yields a value of .706, indicating a strong relationship 
between indicators. The index includes respondents who answered “tend to agree” or 
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“tend to disagree” to at least 4 out of 5 questions to ensure that the dependent variable is 
measured comprehensively. 
 
Control Variables 
As the literature suggests, the following demographic variables have been shown 
to be correlated with opinion of globalization and are thusly included in the analysis to 
counter spuriousness. The expectation is that individuals that are younger and who live in 
a larger locality will have more of a tendency to have a positive opinion of globalization, 
whereas women, the unemployed and individuals supporting the political left will have 
more of a tendency to have a negative opinion of globalization (O’Rourke and Sinnott 
2001; Rankin 2001; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Edwards 
2006).  
Prediction in regards to education and skill level varies according to country 
wealth. Individuals of higher education and skill level are generally in favor of 
globalization but this relationship is either weakened or reversed in poorer nations 
(Rankin 2001; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2001; Mayda and Rodrik 2005). For this reason, 
separate control variables are included for wealthier and poorer countries in regards to 
education, skilled manual workers and unskilled manual workers to account for the 
interaction of these demographic characteristics with country wealth (See Table 2). 
Country GDP per capita data was used to decipher an appropriate cutoff point between 
wealthy and poorer countries
1
 (United Nations 2010). 
                                                 
1
 Poorer countries include Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain 
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Since the current study focuses on the economic dimension of globalization it is, 
therefore, necessary to include some controls in regards to respondents’ economic 
expectations. What emerges from the literature is that economic expectations can affect 
one’s perspective on trade integration (Rankin 2001; Edward 2006). The expectation is 
that individuals who have negative economic expectations will tend to have a negative 
opinion of globalization. In operationalizing this variable, an index is constructed using 
the following four indicators: 
1. Respondent’s expectation of his or her country’s economic situation in the next 12 
months 
2. Respondent’s expectation of his or her household financial situation in the next 12 
months 
3. Respondent’s expectation of his or her employment situation in the next 12 months 
4. Respondent’s expectation of his or her personal job situation in the next 12 months 
A Cronbach’s alpha analysis yields a value of .762, indicating a strong 
relationship between indicators. In constructing the index, all respondents that answered 
“don’t know” are coded as “missing”.  
Attitudes toward and opinion of the EU is an issue of great theoretical and 
methodological importance. As previously mentioned, EU citizens experience the 
phenomenon of globalization through the EU. It is, therefore, prudent to include attitudes 
toward, and opinion of, the EU as a control variable to determine whether or not the 
respondents’ opinions of globalization are influenced by their attitudes toward the EU. 
The respondents’ opinion on whether his or her country has on balance benefited from 
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being a member of the EU will be included in the analysis as a measure of attitude and 
opinion toward the EU. The expectation is that EU citizens who believe that their country 
has benefited from the EU will tend to have a positive opinion of globalization.  
Country of citizenship is another variable that has been shown to be correlated 
with opinion of globalization (O Rourke and Sinnot 2001; Lagos 2003; Mayda and 
Rodrik 2005; Edwards 2006). Countries differ significantly in respect to their social, 
political and economic conditions and this might have a considerable impact on 
individuals’ perception of globalization. Union strength, labor legislation and cultural and 
economic history are all factors that can influence individuals’ opinion of globalization. 
Therefore, country of citizenship is included in the analysis as a control. For example, the 
Greeks have always fashioned an anti-imperialist stance, often conflated with an anti-
globalization attitude and mistrust of the U.S.. Following the global economic collapse of 
2008, which had a devastating effect on the country‘s economic and social fabric, Greek 
extremists, in a display of discontent, bombed the offices of JP Morgan, an American 
financial investment company, in Athens (Associated Press 2010).  
Moreover, in an attempt to gather large enough country samples, several smaller-
sized countries such as Luxembourg, were over-sampled and are overrepresented (See 
Table 1). Including country control variables eliminates potential problems with 
overrepresentation. The countries pertinent to the study are the 15 nation-states that were 
members of the EU when the survey was conducted: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, United 
Kingdom, Austria, Sweden and Finland. Each country is coded as a nominal dichotomous 
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variable. Preliminary statistics show that, overall, France has the lowest mean score in 
regards to opinion of globalization. Therefore, France will serve as the reference category 
in the regression analyses to which all other countries are measured against. Odds ratio 
returns measure likelihood of positive opinion of globalization in relation to France. In 
other words, the analysis illustrates the relative likelihood of individuals from all other 14 
countries, respectively, compared to those of France, to have a positive opinion of 
globalization. 
The following tables provide further details on the various control variables that 
are included in the analysis. Table 1 enumerates all 15 EU countries that are included in 
the analysis and their respective sample sizes, populations and country averages for 
opinion of globalization. Table 2 lists all other control variables, providing descriptive 
statistics and information on how each variable is coded.  
 
Table 1: Country Descriptive Statistics 
Country   	  Mean Opinion of Globalization Population (2004) 
Belgium   976   .3854     10,396,421 
Denmark  1019   .5261    5,397,640 
Germany  2092   .3705    82,531,671 
Greece   1023   .3414    11,040,650 
Spain   1006   .4220    42,345,342 
France   1060   .3045    62,292,241 
Ireland   1046   .4933    4,027,732 
Italy   1086   .4244    57,888,245 
Luxembourg  458   .3877    454,960 
Netherlands  1056   .5233    16,258,032 
Portugal   1081   .4438    10,474,685 
United Kingdom  1284   .4848    59,699,828 
Austria   1044   .3809    8,142,573 
Sweden   996   .5330    8,975,670 
Finland   1038   .4753    5,219,732 
Source = Eurobarometer 61.0, 2004, Eurostat 2010 
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Table 2: Control Variables  
Variable    Descriptives of Variable  Coding of Categories   
  Education (Poorer Countries)
2
  26.3%    1 = 0 – 15 
     43.7%    2 = 15 – 19  
     30.1%    3 = 20+ 
 
Education (Wealthier Countries)  25.8%    0 = Poorer Countries 
     15.1%    1 = 0 – 15 
     35.3%    2 = 15 – 19  
     23.9%    3 = 20+ 
 
Age     Mean: 45.33   Scale   
     Standard Deviation: 18.338    
  
Gender     47.6%    0 = Male 
     52.4%    1 = Female  
  
 
Political Ideology   Mean: 5.25   10-Point Scale  
     Standard Deviation:  2.070 1 = Left, 10 = Right 
   
           
          
Locality     32.6%    0 = Rural or Village  
     39.4%    1 = Small/Midsized Town   
     27.6%    3 = Large Town   
 
Skilled Manual Worker   91.2%    0 = Not Skilled Worker 
(Poorer Countries)  
     8.8%    1 = Skilled Worker 
    
Unskilled Manual Worker   95.4%    0 = Not Unskilled Worker 
(Poorer Countries)  
     4.6%    1 = Unskilled Worker 
  
Skilled Manual Worker    93.3%    0 = Other Employment 
(Wealthier Countries)       or Skilled Worker in  
         Poorer Countries 
       6.7%    1 = Skilled Worker 
           In Wealthier Country  
 
Unskilled Manual Worker   96.5%    0 = Other Employment 
(Wealthier Countries)       or Unskilled Worker in 
         Poorer Countries  
     3.5%    1 = Unskilled Worker 
         In Wealthier Countries 
 
Wealthier Countries
3
   25.8%    0 = Poorer Country  
                                                 
2
 The survey question asks: “How old were you when you stopped full-time education?” 
3
 This variable controls for individuals who live in wealthier nations. It is included in the analysis to 
account for the interaction between country wealth and education and skill level. 
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     74.2%    1 = Wealthier Country 
 
Unemployed    93.2%    0 = Not Unemployed  
     6.8%    1 = Unemployed   
 
Economic Expectations   32.6%    0 = Worse 
     47.5%    1 = Same 
     19.9%    2 = Better 
 
EU Benefit    38%    0 = Not Benefited 
     62%    1 = Benefited  
Source= Eurobarometer 61.0, 2004 
 
Limitations 
The following section deconstructs the current study’s limitations. Explanation is 
given for the various challenges that were encountered and how they were dealt with 
during data analysis. 
 The manner in which the education variable was operationalized initially in the 
dataset is problematic. The survey questionnaire asks the respondents how old they were 
when they stopped their full-time education. Those who were attending school full-time 
at the time of the interview were coded as “00”. This presents various challenges and 
limitations. Most importantly, the age at which one stops their full-time education is not 
necessarily reflective of their level of education. The educational path that people choose 
to take is not always linear in that they attend junior school, then high-school, then 
college and then post-graduate school. For example, some individuals choose to join the 
workforce after high-school and continue their higher education years later. While keenly 
aware of the limitations of this variable, it is, nonetheless, included in the analysis as a 
loose measure of education. The objective is not necessarily to produce exact numbers 
that are representative of reality but, rather, to observe general tendencies in the 
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population. In choosing to use this variable in the analysis, it had to be modified 
accordingly to increase, as much as possible, its validity. Therefore, units that were coded 
as “00” were recoded to “age”, in an attempt to include in the analysis individuals who 
were full-time students at the time of the interview and to decrease the number of missing 
cases. 
The manner in which almost all variables were coded presents further limitations. 
Most variables contained a “don’t know” category. This category had to be discarded as 
“missing” throughout the analysis for two reasons. First, it did not inform the theoretical 
framework. For example, a “don’t know” answer in regards to a question on trust in the 
national government does not produce any data that is useful in answering the research 
question of whether trust placed in national institutions correlates with EU citizens’ 
opinion of globalization. Furthermore, a “don’t know” category is symbolically nebulous 
and, therefore, cannot be coded and organized in a manner that is linear or ordinal. For 
example, consider the following survey question: “Generally speaking, do you think that 
(OUR COUNTRY)’s membership of the European Union is…?”, the response categories 
for which are “a bad thing”, “neither good or bad”, “a good thing” and “don’t know”. A 
“don’t know” answer does not indicate, in any way whether the respondent feels good, 
bad or neutral in regards to the question and, therefore, cannot be included in the ordinal 
sequence of categories when conducting the analysis. Therefore, all the “don’t know” 
categories were coded as “missing”. This creates several problems.  
First, as the analysis becomes more complex and more variables are included, the 
number of missing cases increases. The final logistic regression model, for example, 
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includes only half of the initial number of respondents. Second, while a “don’t know” 
category does not indicate directional attitude or neutrality, it is nonetheless 
representative of individuals’ attitude toward a certain issue and can produce insightful 
findings. Third, excluding the “don’t know” category is problematic when collapsing 
multiple indicators into a single index. The reason for this is that individuals who 
answered “don’t know” to any one of the indicator questions, are excluded from the 
entire index. This produces a problematically large number of missing cases. 
However, in assessing the construction of the indices, preliminary descriptive 
statistics and histograms show that “don’t know” answers occur at random. Histograms 
were constructed that included respondents that answered either all of the questions, 4 out 
of 5 questions and 3 out of 5 questions for both the dependent and independent variable 
indices. What was clearly evident was that the distribution of the data was minimally 
affected in the exclusion of individuals who answered “don’t know” to 1 or 2 questions. 
In other words, there is nothing unique about those individuals as the rest of their answers 
are congruent with the population at large. Therefore, in excluding them from the 
analysis, the distribution, trends and tendencies of the data do not appear to be affected. 
Moreover, in constructing both the independent and dependent variable indices, only 
those respondents who answered “don’t know” to 2 or more of 5 questions are excluded. 
This was done to strike a balance between constructing variables that are measured 
comprehensively and reducing the number of missing cases. Furthermore, the initial 
number of respondents is 16,212 ensuring an adequate number of cases even after the 
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“don’t know” categories have been coded as missing. For example, the final regression 
model includes an ample 7446 cases. 
There are also limitations in regards to the operationalization of the dependent 
variable. As already stated, the dependent variable of opinion of globalization is 
operationalized using five questions from the Eurobarometer survey in regards to issues 
of national sovereignty. While those five indicators are adequate in operationalizing 
opinion of globalization for the purpose of the study, they, nonetheless, fall short in 
reflecting the theoretical and actual complexity of the subject matter. Ideally, the 
dependent variable would have been operationalized in a comprehensive manner, taking 
into account various other dimensions and nuances of opinion of globalization in regards 
to issues of national sovereignty. For example, the survey questionnaire could have 
included questions explicitly in regards to economic sovereignty, such as: 
• “Do you believe that globalization compromises the government’s capacity to 
effectively control the national economy?” 
• “Do you believe that globalization represents a threat to our local businesses?” 
• “Do you believe that globalization contributes to economic instability?” 
 Another limitation of the dataset is the fact that it does not contain data for all 
current EU member states. The data was collected in 2004, shortly before the EU 
enlargement process which acceded 12 countries (see Appendix for a list of all current 
EU member states). The findings are therefore pertinent to the EU population prior to the 
2004 enlargement process. Conceivably, the inclusion of all 27 EU member states could 
affect the findings. This is due to the fact that the recently acceded population is 
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considerably different in regards to socio-historic experience compared to Western 
Europe, especially in considering the fact that many of the newly-acceded countries 
formerly belonged to the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the current study provides useful 
insight on EU citizens’ opinions and attitudes that should be taken into consideration 
regardless of whether the newly acceded countries are not included in the analysis, 
especially in considering that the majority of the EU population and the most influential 
countries, including the EU founders, are included. Let us now proceed to the analysis. 
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CHAPTER 5: Analysis and Findings 
The analysis begins with an examination of the descriptive statistics of the 
independent and depending variable. As Chart 1 illustrates, the majority of EU citizens 
tend to trust their national institutions (56.6%) and, as Chart 2 illustrates, tend to have a 
negative opinion of globalization (57.8%) in regards to issues of national sovereignty. 
These findings are consistent with the theoretical prediction, in that there would be more 
of a tendency for citizens to trust their national institutions and less of a tendency to have 
a positive opinion of globalization in regards to issues of national sovereignty. 
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Tend to Trust Tend Not to Trust
Chart 1: Trust in National Institutions 
(%)
 
Source: Eurobarometer 61.0, 2004 
N = 14,470 
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Chart 2: Opinion of 
Globalization (%)
 
Source: Eurobarometer 61.0, 2004  
N = 11,847 
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A bivariate analysis is then conducted, pertaining directly to the research 
hypothesis, comparing trust placed in national institutions with opinion of globalization. 
As Table 3 illustrates, there is a tendency among both groups of EU citizens who trust 
and do not trust their national institutions to have a negative opinion of globalization in 
regards to issues of national sovereignty. However, EU citizens who trust their national 
institutions have more of a tendency to have a positive opinion of globalization. For 
example, 49.6% of EU citizens who trust their national institutions have a positive 
opinion of globalization, while only 33.6% of EU citizens who do not trust their national 
institutions have a positive opinion of globalization.  
Table 3: EU Citizens’ Opinion of Globalization, By ational Trust (%) 
 
       ational Trust    
 
       Trust  Don’t Trust   
 
Opinion of Globalization  Positive   49.6  33.6    
     Negative 50.4   66.4  
    
Total       100  100    
Source= Eurobarometer 61.0, 2004 
p < .001 
N = 10,946 
What follows is a regression analysis. Since the dependent variable is a 
dichotomous variable, logistic regressions are used, establishing 2 models predicting 
opinion of globalization. The analyses yields some interesting findings presented in Table 
4. The main independent variable, trust in national institutions, is shown to predict 
opinion of globalization in both regression models. In Model 2, after country control 
variables are included, trust in national institutions yields a statistically significant (p < 
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.001) coefficient of .396. The odds ratio value suggest that individuals who trust their 
national institutions are 1.486 times as likely to have a positive opinion of globalization 
in regards to issues of national sovereignty compared to those who do not trust their 
national institutions.  
Several demographic characteristics also predict opinion of globalization. In 
respect to age, Model 2 suggests that as one’s age increases their likelihood of positive 
opinion of globalization decreases. Specifically, for every year of increase in age, 
respondents are .006 (1 - .994) times less likely to have a positive opinion of 
globalization (p < .001). These findings are consistent with the literature. Compared to 
older individuals, younger adults are more exposed to the global media, the internet and 
foreign languages and travel more. This contributes to the development of a supranational 
conception of identity which, in turn, posits globalization in a more favorable view. 
In respect to political ideology, the findings suggest that individuals on the “right” 
of the political ideology spectrum are more likely to have a positive opinion of 
globalization. As Model 2 suggests, for every unit of increase toward the “right” 
spectrum, respondents are 1.069 times as likely to have a positive opinion of 
globalization (p < .001). From a cultural standpoint, these findings are unexpected. The 
political right has demonstrated a tendency to rhetorically reject globalization, especially 
in regards to cultural and political issues. However, from an economic standpoint these 
findings are not surprising as the political right has traditionally and consistently favored 
liberal economic practices.  
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Unemployment and gender also predict opinion of globalization. In Model 2, 
unemployed respondents are .214 (1 - .786 = .214) times less likely to have a positive 
opinion of globalization compared to those who are not (p < .05). The gender variable 
yielded an odds ratio value of .876 indicating that women, compared to men, are .124 (1 - 
.876 = .124) times less likely to have a positive opinion of globalization in regards to 
issues of national sovereignty (p < .05). In other words, both the unemployed and women 
have more of a tendency to have a negative opinion of globalization. These finding are 
consistent with both the theoretical and the empirical literature on globalization.  
A prevalent theme in the literature is that individuals who are socially and 
economically vulnerable because of globalization, as is the case with women and the 
unemployed, are less likely to have a positive opinion of globalization because they feel 
victimized by its invasive effects, particularly in regards to the economy (O’Rourke and 
Sinnott 2001; Steve and Slaughter 2001; Mayda and Rodrik 2005). In regards to gender, 
additional statistical analyses of income reveal that income disparities persist within the 
EU. For example, 19% of women, compared to 14.7% of men fall within the lowest 
income bracket. In contrast, 18.9% of men, compared to 15.8% of women, fall within the 
highest income bracket. Notable is the fact that, in recent decades, there has been an 
official and coordinated effort on behalf of the EU to reduce the gender gap (Verloo 
2006; Meier and Lombardo 2008; Walby 2008). However, academics point to the fact 
that while the gender gap has been curtailed in recent years, gender disparities still persist 
within the EU (Walby 2008; Occhionero and Nocenzi 2009). This has been attributed to 
the EU’s to failure to address the particularity of gender inequalities, compared to other 
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types of inequalities such as income, particularly as an outcome of structural 
mechanisms, the state and the private sphere (Verloo 2006). Others cite the EU’s official 
framing of gender as the culprit, which constructs gender-differentiated citizens, 
presenting women as mothers, workers and victims (Meier and Lombardo 2008). As 
Meier and Lombardo suggest, the promotions of “legal gender equality and 
acknowledging the existence of gender obstacles to the enjoyment of an equal citizenship 
for women, are not by definition translated into policy initiatives transformative of 
traditional gender roles” (Meier and Lombardo 2008:489).  
In regards to unemployment, interestingly, further statistical analyses show that 
individuals who are unemployed are also more likely to mistrust their national 
institutions. For example, 54.7% of those who are unemployed do not trust their national 
institutions compared to the 45.3% who do. This indicates that, counter to the literature, 
nation-states, whose legitimate representatives are its national institutions, are not 
necessarily assessed in opposition to globalization. In essence, in the wake of the 
economic uncertainties of globalization, EU citizens do not necessarily revert to the more 
traditional institutions of the nation-state. 
Education also predicts opinion of globalization. As Model 2 illustrates, 
individuals with greater levels of education that live in poorer countries are .128 (1 - .872 
= .128) times less likely to have a positive opinion of globalization (p < .05). On the 
contrary, individuals with greater levels of education that live in wealthier nations are 
1.254 times as likely to have a positive opinion of globalization (p < .05). These findings 
are consistent with the literature, in that individuals who are more educated and live in 
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wealthier countries tend to have a positive opinion of globalization because they are in a 
better position to benefit from the global economic system. On the other hand, 
individuals who are more educated but that live in poorer countries, which are generally 
more vulnerable to the effects of globalization, tend to have a negative opinion of 
globalization because they are conscious of their vulnerability.  
Similar tendencies are observed in regards to skill level. As Table 4 illustrates, 
skilled manual workers from wealthier countries tend to have a positive opinion of 
globalization while skilled manual workers from poorer countries tend to have a negative 
opinion of globalization. As Model 2 suggests, skilled manual workers from wealthier 
nations are 1.869 times as likely to have a positive opinion of globalization (p > .05) 
while skilled manual workers from poorer countries are .392 (1 - .608 = .392) times less 
likely to have a positive opinion of globalization (p < .05). Again, these findings are 
consistent with the literature which suggests that individuals who are of higher skill level 
and live in wealthier countries tend to have a positive opinion of globalization because 
they are in a better position to benefit from the global economic system. On the other 
hand, skilled workers from poorer countries tend to have a negative opinion of 
globalization because they are conscious of their potential vulnerability to the global 
economic system. 
Economic expectations also predict opinion of globalization in regards to issues 
of national sovereignty, yielding a statistically significant coefficient of .269 (p < .001) 
and an odds ratio value of 1.309 in Model 2. The findings indicate that the better a 
respondent’s economic expectations are the more likely he or she will have a positive 
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opinion of globalization. These findings are consistent with the literature which 
consistently demonstrates that economic expectations are an important predictor of 
opinion of globalization. Globalization has created a global economic system that is 
highly dynamic, volatile and uncertain. Individuals who are impacted by globalization’s 
economic uncertainty and who, therefore, have a negative outlook on their economic 
future are less likely to regard globalization in a positive light, to which they attribute 
their lack of future economic prosper. 
The most interesting finding regards respondents’ opinion of the EU which in 
Model 2 yields a coefficient of .969 (p < .001). Respondents who are of the opinion that, 
overall, their country has benefited from being a member of the EU are 2.636 times as 
likely to have a positive opinion of globalization in regards to issues of national 
sovereignty. In other words, EU citizens who believe that they have benefited from the 
EU are more likely to have a positive opinion of globalization. These findings are 
congruent with the theoretical framework put forth in the present study. EU citizens 
experience the phenomenon of globalization through the vehicle and the lens of the EU, 
functioning as a steering force in the wake of this invasive and unpredictable 
phenomenon. As suggested by the literature, one of the main functions of the EU is to 
mitigate the negative effects of the globalized economy through economic, 
intergovernmental and socio-cultural integration. The outcome is a united and highly 
structured economic, socio-political bloc, highly empowered by its collective strength in 
the wake of globalized realities. It, therefore, makes perfect sense that EU citizens’ 
 
100 
 
opinion of globalization is filtered through their country’s experience of the EU. But what 
about the individual countries themselves? 
As previously mentioned, country odds ratios represent likelihood of positive 
opinion of globalization compared to France, which, in preliminary analyses yielded the 
lowest mean in regards to the dependent variable. In reference to Model 2, the countries 
that yielded the highest odds ratios, indicating likelihood of positive opinion of 
globalization, by no surprise, are Denmark (2.547), the Netherlands (3.341), Sweden 
(5.259), Ireland (2.586) and the U.K. (3.086). In other words, these are the countries 
whose citizens have more of a tendency to have a positive opinion of globalization. The 
reasons behind these findings are clear.  
Countries such as Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands come from a social-
democratic tradition where governments are actively involved in the national economic 
system. Traditionally, the economic policies enacted in these countries were done to 
ensure economic equity and worker protection (Mills et al. 2008). As an outcome, their 
citizens have been buffered from the negative economic effects of globalization and, 
therefore, tend to have a more positive opinion of globalization.  
Ireland, at the time the survey was conducted, had benefited greatly from both its 
EU membership and globalization. Due to its originally below average standard of living, 
Ireland received large amounts of economic help from other EU member states as part of 
the EU’s structural adjustment funds, which aim to “level the playing field” by 
redistributing money from the wealthier nations to the poorer ones. This, in conjunction 
with the economic opportunities imparted by globalization have, in recent years resulted 
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in unprecedented economic growth and have elevated the standard of living of Ireland 
above the EU average. It is, therefore, by no surprise that Irish citizens are amongst the 
staunchest supporters of globalization. 
In considering the findings concerning the U.K., there is theoretical ambiguity. 
The U.K. has always been highly skeptical of the EU and has consistently demonstrated 
exceptionalism. Evidence of this is the U.K.’s refusal to join the EU’s monetary union in 
using a single currency, the Euro. Moreover, the U.K. has emerged from a highly 
nationalistic tradition and, even in recent years, has been highly resistant and wary of 
transnational agreements or external forces which could potentially compromise its 
national sovereignty. In this regard, the findings are quite surprising. However, the U.K. 
has also emerged from a historical tradition rooted in colonialism and free market 
capitalism. No empire has contributed to the global proliferation of capitalism as much as 
the British Empire has and, what is currently the U.K., has benefited greatly from its 
history of global colonial capitalism. Furthermore, ever since the administration of 
Margaret Thatcher, neo-liberal ideals and economic policies have dominated the political 
atmosphere of the U.K. Therefore, it is by no surprise that U.K. citizens have a positive 
opinion of globalization, even in regards to issues of national sovereignty. Let us now 
proceed to an interpretation of the findings based on the comprehensive conception of 
globalization presented in Chapter 2 and the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 
3. 
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Table 4. Logistic Regression Models Predicting Positive Opinion of Globalization 
Variable     Model 1  Model 2  
Trust in National Institutions   .407**  .396** 
      (1.502)  (1.486) 
Demographics 
Gender (Female)     -.155*  -.132* 
      (.857)  (.876) 
Age      -.006**  -.006** 
      (.994)  (.994) 
Education (Poorer Countries)   -.146*  -.137* 
      (.864)  (.872) 
Education (Wealthier Countries)   .287**  .226* 
      (1.332)  (1.254) 
Political Ideology (Right)    .058**  .066** 
      (1.060)  (1.069) 
Locality (Urban)     -.022  .026 
      (1.022)  (1.027) 
Unemployed     -.316*  -.241* 
      (.729)  (.786) 
Skilled Manual Worker (Poorer Countries)  -.436*  -.497* 
      (.647)  (.608) 
Skilled Manual Worker (Wealthier Countries) .489*  .626* 
      (1.631)  (1.869)  
Unskilled Manual Worker (Poorer Countries) -.101  -.319 
      (.904)  (.727) 
Unskilled Manual Worker (Wealthier Countries) .206  .357 
      (1.229)  (1.429) 
Wealthier Countries    -.196  -1.507 
      (.822)  (.221) 
Economic Expectations    .284**  .269** 
      (1.328)  (1.309) 
Country Benefited from EU   .795**  .969** 
      (2.215)  (2.636) 
 
Countries (France is Reference Country) 
Belgium        .261 
        (1.298) 
Denmark       .935** 
        (2.547) 
Germany       .480** 
        (1.617) 
Greece        -1.262 
        (.283) 
Spain        -.727 
        (.484) 
Ireland        .950** 
        (2.586) 
Italy        -.325 
        (.722) 
Luxemburg       .278 
        (1.321) 
Netherlands       1.206** 
        (3.341) 
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Portugal        -.202 
        (.817) 
U.K.        1.127** 
        (3.086) 
Austria        .541** 
        (1.718) 
Sweden        1.660** 
        (5.259) 
Finland        .849** 
        (2.337) 
 
Constant     -1.215** -.740 
Number of Cases     7572  7572 
-2 Log Likelihood    9714.172** 9375.659** 
	ote: Unstandardized logistic coefficients with odds ratios in parentheses.       
* p < .05  ** p < .01 
Source= Eurobarometer 61.0, 2004 
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CHAPTER 6: Discussion 
The current study inquires whether trust in national institutions correlates with EU 
citizens’ opinion of globalization in regards to issues of national sovereignty. It was 
hypothesized that EU citizens who place more trust in their national institutions are more 
likely to have a negative opinion of globalization. The hypothesis was generated in 
consideration of both the historic literature on nationalism and the globalization literature, 
both of which show a staunch correlation between national attachment and rejection of 
forces external to the nation-state that compromise national sovereignty. The findings 
suggest that the hypothesis does not hold true. 
Overall, the findings show that EU citizens have a tendency to trust their national 
institutions and have a negative opinion of globalization in regards to issues of national 
sovereignty. However, in examining and contrasting those who trust their national 
institutions to those who do not, we find that there is more of a tendency to have a 
positive opinion of globalization among EU citizens who do trust their national 
institutions. The findings can be interpreted as follows. 
Historically, nationalism’s value system i.e. patriotism, historical destiny and 
perceived ethnic superiority, and its structural components i.e. national institutions were 
intrinsically tied. This tendency was observed in all European countries, particularly 
those under totalitarian regimes that surfaced during the 1930s, which had the 
overwhelming, if not the absolute, countenance of their citizens. During this time most 
European countries were taken over by authoritarian governments, as was the case with 
Italy, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Poland, Hungary and so forth (Goff et al. 1998). During 
this era of extreme nationalism, citizens not only pledged full support to the nation-state, 
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but they also legitimated the state’s use of violence to repress and oppress opposition that 
challenged the nation, the state or its institutions.  
There is the possibility that the interplay of the EU and globalization has 
generated a culture wherein nationalism as a world view and experience has been 
reconfigured so that the structural components of the nation-state, such as its institutions, 
are differentiated from its nationalistic value system. Therefore, trust in national 
institutions is not necessarily an attitude informed by, and intrinsically tied to, 
nationalism’s value system which rejects forces external to the nation-state. As an 
outcome, trust in national institutions is not posited against globalization. 
This differentiation of the nation-state’s structural components from its 
nationalistic value system may occur because of the economic and social benefits that the 
EU imparts. The EU is an economic socio-political system consciously constructed to 
effectively manage globalization and to mitigate its negative effects, particularly in 
regards to the economy. An example of this is the EU’s Structural and Cohesion funds, 
which aim to reduce development and economic disparities between member states 
(Europa 2009). These funds represent 35% of the EU’s budget and its main contributors 
are the EU’s richest and most prosperous member states and are diverted to less 
prosperous member states in an attempt to reduce economic inequalities and to promote 
further integration (Europa 2009). To fully understand the EU’s importance in providing 
and sustaining economic benefit and its subsequent impact on the nation-state, one has to 
consider the conditions under which the nation-state emerged. 
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Among other things, the nation-state’s genesis has its roots in economic interests, 
both in terms of the elites which sought to further empower their social and economic 
status through the nation-state, but also through the general populace which sought 
economic and social stability through the nation-state. However, the nation-state’s 
capacity to impart these economic benefits has been adversely affected because of 
globalization. But within the EU, because globalization is systematically managed, the 
nation-state and its citizens are not only empowered economically but are also in a better 
position to reap the economic benefits of globalization. In light of this, it is reasonable to 
assert that because of the tremendous economic benefits that the EU puts forth, through 
its managing of globalization, national attachment is not necessarily experienced in 
opposition to globalization. Rather, the nation-state, via the EU, might be experienced as 
an empowering entity, efficacious in providing economic sustainability. Perhaps, more 
than anything else, what enables the EU to effectively manage globalization is the fact 
that it has been configured in a system of shared-national sovereignty.  
As previously mentioned, the EU is a an intergovernmental and supranational 
system of governance, whose member states are interconnected via reciprocal socio-
democratic processes premised on the rule of law, security and justice, peace and 
stability, diversity and economic and social solidarity, configured in a socio-political 
system of pooled sovereignty (McCormick 2005; Europa 2009). The EU’s unique socio-
political structural configuration has generated a social order wherein member states and 
their respective societies are intrinsically tied, co-dependent and cooperatively managing 
and making decisions about their social, economic and political future. As McCormick 
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suggests, “Increasingly, national and European interests have become indistinguishable 
from each other” (McCormick 2005:111).   
Moreover, there has been a shift in power and authority from the member states to 
the EU (McCormick 2005). In various cases this results in EU law, policy and the 
collective priorities of its member states taking precedence over that of individual 
member states. In this sense, national sovereignty within the EU takes on a supranational 
dimension as it extends beyond national borders and, most importantly, is experienced as 
such. This is not only due to the fact that the EU has made a conscious effort in 
promoting the value of supranationalism, but also due to the fact that supranationalism 
and inter-governmentalism is institutionalized. An example of this is the European 
Parliament whose parties are comprised of multinational representatives. In this sense, 
the European Parliament is the first parliament with parties of multinational constituents.  
In essence, the EU has generated the conditions wherein national attachment is 
not necessarily posited against globalization, since the national experience takes on an 
international and transnational dimension. Globalization, as mediated through the EU, is 
experienced and essentially becomes, at least to some extent, a part of the nation-state. 
The EU can be considered a contained and managed form of globalization, rigidly 
structured between its member states, wherein national institutions, via EU mechanisms, 
extend and function beyond the nation-state. This structured and contained form of 
globalization, that is nonetheless economically, socially and politically fluid between EU 
member states, might have an effect on the way EU citizens view and experience 
globalization in general. This is due to the fact that their experience of globalization is 
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one that is contained, managed, beneficial and most importantly, one that extends the 
nation-state in an economic, socio-political system beyond its borders in a system of 
shared national sovereignty. It is in this way that the nation-state is experienced as part of 
a broader globalized order and thusly not posited in opposition to globalization. 
The EU has also contributed to the development of a European socio-political 
consciousness wherein the nation-state is experienced not as separate, but as a part of the 
EU. Empirical data confirm this assertion. A question pertaining to national identity on 
the Eurobarometer survey interview asked the respondents whether they considered 
themselves as “national only”, “national and European” or “only European”. 
Interestingly, the plurality (46%) of the respondents, consider themselves as both national 
and European. As Hooghe and Marks suggest, “European integration reinforces 
multiculturalism. It erodes exclusionary norms of ‘us’ and ‘them’ that are deeply rooted 
in the creation of European national states” (Hooghe and Marks 2005:423).  
This emergence of European supranational consciousness has had the effect of 
weakening the traditional, rigid conception of national identity which had been 
particularly prevalent and salient in Europe during the 19
th
 and first half of the 20
th
 
century. National identity is experientially and intrinsically tied to the nation-state and, by 
implication, to the nation-state’s sovereignty. An emergence of a supranational 
consciousness inevitably weakens and relativizes national identity and, consequently, 
nationalistic and rigid conceptions of national sovereignty. This experiential social 
paradigm shift, even though it initially occurs within the framework of the EU, wherein 
national identity and, by implication, national attachment is relativized, allows for an 
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experience of globalization that is not posited in opposition to the nation-state. The 
nation-state and its sovereignty might be challenged by globalization, but this challenge 
is not necessarily perceived and interpreted through a rigid nationalistic world outlook 
which cannot accept a compromised nation-state. Rather, supranationalism, even though 
in this case initially emerges within the EU, tends toward an experience wherein the 
individual and his or her identity are tied to a broader, global social order. 
The EU has also redefined the symbolic and experiential meaning of citizenship. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, globalization has had the effect of compromising the 
experience of the national citizen due to the fact that it undermines the state apparatus’ 
efficacy and capacity to provide to its citizens economic and social stability and 
sustainability. In essence, citizens are left to fend for themselves against a volatile and 
increasingly dynamic global economic system. The EU has managed to mitigate the 
negative effects of globalization by granting supranational efficacy and rights to its 
citizens. This occurs on two levels.  
It occurs on the internal level wherein EU citizens’ legal rights extend beyond 
national borders. For example, EU citizens have the capacity to work, travel, become 
educated, invest and file law suits across national lines. It also occurs on the inter-
governmental and supranational level. For example, during the global economic collapse 
of 2008, the EU functioned as a coordinator so as to effectively deal with the economic 
woes in an inter-governmental and supranational fashion. Taking the British response to 
the financial crisis as a model, the EU launched initiatives aimed at curbing the crisis 
across the rest of Europe by proposing sales tax cuts, tackling the housing crisis and 
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offering relief to carmakers (Euronews 2008b). The EU also grants greater efficacy to its 
citizens on the international level by functioning as a representative and advocate for both 
its member states and its citizen constituents, such as in international meetings and 
functions like the G8 summits. 
This has generated conditions wherein citizenship is experienced on a 
supranational level. As Sassen suggests, “citizenship is at least partly and variably shaped 
by the conditions within which it is embedded” (Sassen 2006:280). In altering the 
structural, experiential, functional and symbolic realities of citizenship, the EU has 
redefined it. Citizenship, “even if situated in institutional settings that are ‘national’, is a 
possibly changed institution if the meaning of the national itself has changed” (Sassen 
2006:280). 
Ever since the advent of modernity, citizenship has been intrinsically tied to the 
nation-state and conventionally experienced as separate to anything external. However, 
within the EU, citizenship is intrinsically tied to a social and political order constituted by 
a multiplicity of nation-states. The EU citizen is a part of this reality. Therefore, 
citizenship within the EU is not solely tied to the nation-state. Rather, citizenship, 
through the framework of the EU, takes on an international character and becomes an 
international experience. This has had the effect of compromising rigid and nationalistic 
conceptions of citizenship that had been prevalent in Europe throughout the 19
th
 and first 
half of the 20
th
 century. In elevating the experience of the citizen to the supranational 
level, and reinforcing it with supranational protection against globalization, the EU has 
generated conditions where citizenship is slowly being detached from its traditional 
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counterpart – the nation-state – and is becoming a part of a broader, but nonetheless 
contained and effectively managed, order. What reinforces this experiential shift of 
citizenship from the national to the supranational level is the EU’s success in providing a 
framework where the functions of citizenship become more effective in the framework of 
globalization. In doing so, it has reinforced the nation-states’ function of granting and 
sustaining citizenship. For this reason national attachment is not necessarily experienced 
in opposition to globalization. 
In considering the above, what clearly transpires is that EU citizens’ experience of 
globalization is funneled through their experience of the EU. It is by no surprise, then, 
that the greatest predictor of positive opinion of globalization is whether the respondent 
feels that overall, his or her country has benefited from its EU membership. This 
interplay between opinion of globalization, opinion of the EU and national attachment is 
structured through the conditions put forth by the EU, such as the opening up of 
economies, free travel and migration, inter-country work mobility and the supranational 
institutionalization of democracy. It is also structured through the EU’s function as a 
buffer against the negative effects of globalization by granting agency and collective 
efficacy to its citizens. Empirical data confirm this assertion. When asked who they 
trusted the most to deal with the effects of globalization, choosing from a list of 
institutions, organizations and countries, the plurality of EU citizens (30.6%) chose the 
EU. 
In essence, much in accord with the theoretical framework put forth in Chapter 3, 
the EU can be thought of as a highly structured mechanism, intended to strategically 
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manage globalization and to mitigate its negative effects. This is achieved by facilitating 
sustainable and beneficial economic conditions and by effectively utilizing the 
opportunities of globalization while diminishing its threats. As discussed earlier, the EU 
was initiated on the basis of economic incentives and considerations, the purpose of 
which was to establish economic solidarity among member states in an attempt to 
increase collective economic efficacy as a deterrent of war. As economic integration 
furthered, so did the need for political and social integration. The underlying structures 
that enable the EU to be efficacious in its promotion of economic benefit in the context of 
globalization, is its political configuration, premised on the principle of shared 
sovereignty, and its social integration, which, even though implicit in nature, provides 
additional support for its economic and political structures. This results in the 
development of socio-economic conditions which elevate the experience of the nation-
state to the supranational level.  
Much like the EU, the emergence of nation-states can be attributed, partly, to 
economic incentives and considerations. However, with the advent and the intensification 
of globalization, nation-states were increasingly ineffective in providing economic 
stability and sustainability. The EU has managed to empower the nation-state’s economic 
functions by integrating them to a broader economic order that is actively reinforced by 
transnational cooperation on the political level. As an outcome, the power and efficacy of 
the individual nation-states increase as they become part of a collective. This 
consideration is of particular importance in an era of globalization as global issues and 
challenges, such as climate change, have the capacity to extend beyond national borders 
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and, therefore, require supranational cooperation. Thus, supranationalism, in the context 
of globalization, can be thought of as an especially efficacious tool in dealing with the 
challenges of the nation-state. A global order necessitates global cooperation. In light of 
the above, it is prudent to address and consider potential broader implications. 
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CHAPTER 7: Conclusion 
The present study was formulated in consideration of the challenges, as well as 
the opportunities of globalization. History, as well as the current state of global affairs, 
has taught us that the phenomenon of globalization can generate conditions of potential 
conflict and social and political turmoil. However, globalization also has the capacity to 
contribute to international cooperation, economic and social sustainability and 
supranationalism to the benefit of citizens. The overarching question of the present study 
is under what conditions is globalization experienced not necessarily in opposition to the 
nation-state.  
This formulation was informed not by conviction or ideological support for 
globalization but, rather, as a response to the fact that globalization is a phenomenon that 
has become an existential milieu. It is therefore our duty and responsibility as academics, 
as citizens and as social agents to address the challenges and potentials of globalization. 
The EU represents the potential of globalization. 
This assertion is by no means a naïve call of judgment. Rather, it is one based on 
empirical research and relevant theoretical frameworks. There is no doubt that the 
potential of the EU is tainted by its relative, but nonetheless substantial shortcomings. 
The challenges of the EU are widely cited, ranging from its incapacity to effectively deal 
with immigration, to its citizens’ perceived democratic deficit and lack of transparency 
(Habermas 1998b; McCormick 2005). But these challenges are outweighed by the 
potential of the EU as well as its achievements, particularly in creating and sustaining 
peace in Europe and actively dealing with the challenges of globalization. Above all, the 
EU’s strength lies in its intergovernmental and transnational institutionalization of 
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democracy, sharing of national sovereignty and joint global social and political steering 
(Giddens 2000). This has generated conditions wherein national attachment is not 
necessarily posited against globalization. On the contrary, counter to other systems of 
social organization, national attachment in the EU is one of the greatest predictors of 
positive opinion of globalization. This is where the EU’s potential lies.  
The EU represents a potential future model of social, economic and political 
organization in a globalized world, through its unique capacity to manage globalization 
and impart a beneficial and sustainable economic system by reconfiguring democracy, 
the nation-state and citizenship and elevating them to a supranational level (Giddens 
2000). Giddens sees the EU “as forging a way that could, and very likely will, be 
followed in other regions too” (Gidden 2000:98). Its establishment and achievements 
have been lauded from the very same academics that have called for the creation of 
supranational democratic structures and processes (Habermas 1998b; Giddens 2000). As 
Habermas suggests, politics should “follow the lead of the markets by constructing 
supranational political agencies. Europe, in transition toward the European Union 
provides a suitable example” (Habermas 1998b:413). 
The potentiality for economic integration in a system of supranational democracy, 
particularly one that is modeled after the EU, has attracted considerable academic and 
political interest in recent years, as globalization and its challenges intensify. This is 
reflected in the fact that the EU and its institutional structures have been the subject of 
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rigorous and systematic study both within and outside Europe
4
. Most importantly, the 
EU, as a potential model for social, economic and political organization, has propelled 
other countries to consider the possibility of supranational democracy. This is reflected in 
a recent proposal to create a South Asian Union, modeled after the EU (South Asian 
Union 2005). 
Certainly, this paper is by no means an unqualified endorsement of the EU. The 
potentiality of the EU as a future model for managing globalization and of transnational 
democracy is a subject matter that warrants further study and reflection. The direction 
proposed is the following. The present, as well as previous studies, have demonstrated the 
potential of the EU model as a system for social, economic and political organization in a 
globalized world. In light of this, greater academic, political and civic focus should be 
placed on the EU. Specifically, what need to be studied are the institutional processes of 
the EU that contribute to and sustain its highly integrated economic system, peace and 
supranationalism. Moreover, further study needs to be conducted on how, and in what 
capacity, these processes can be applied in economic socio-political frameworks outside 
of Europe. Lastly, the limitations of the EU, as well as its shortcomings and challenges 
need to be addressed so as to potentially propose solutions to optimize its transnational 
economic socio-democratic model. 
The EU’s greatest potential contribution stems from its ability to build and sustain 
peace, derived from its capacity to effectively manage globalization and reconfigure 
national attachment. This assertion is of great significance when understood in light of 
                                                 
4
 For example, see the following journals: European Union Politics, Journal of European Public Policy, Asia-Pacific 
Journal of EU Studies 
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the fact that Europe is the birth place of nationalism, the greatest contributor to 19
th
 and 
20
th
 century conflict, and the battleground and genesis of two world wars. It is an 
astounding fact that after a century and a half of bloodshed and two world wars, 
Europeans are able to not only live in peace, but also to co-exist in a supranational 
democratic system. Herein exists the EU’s potential contribution to the broader global 
community.  
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